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[363] 
Due Process and Temporal Limits on 
Mandatory Immigration Detention 
Farrin R. Anello* 
Since 1996, the Immigration and Nationality Act has required the government to take into 
custody individuals in removal proceedings who have past convictions for any of a wide 
range of criminal offenses. This provision has led to more than a five-fold increase in the 
number of people detained each day, with harsh consequences for these individuals, their 
families, and communities across the country.  
 
Such a sweeping, categorical detention is not easily reconciled with the Supreme Court’s 
2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, which extended to immigration detention the due 
process limits that the Court has recognized on other forms of civil detention. In Demore 
v. Kim, decided just two years later, the Court rejected an as-applied due process 
challenge to the mandatory immigration detention statute. Throughout the past decade, 
lower courts have sought to reconcile Demore with Zadvydas. As of this writing, three 
circuit courts have avoided a constitutional problem with the mandatory detention statute 
by construing its ambiguous language to impose temporal limits on mandatory detention. 
However, they have not reached consensus on how to define these limits. One circuit has 
adopted a bright-line rule that detention beyond six months requires a bond hearing, 
while two others have adopted a reasonableness standard for determining when a hearing 
is required.  
 
This Article argues that the mandatory detention statute should be construed to govern 
detention for no longer than six months, after which time a bond hearing should be 
required. It reaches this conclusion by analyzing Supreme Court due process doctrine, 
surveying decisions that have implemented the rule and standard discussed above, and 
considering key institutional features of the administrative removal system, including the 
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In 1996, Congress passed a sweeping immigration detention law that 
categorically requires authorities to take into custody in removal 
proceedings non-citizens who have any of a wide range of past convictions. 
More than sixteen years later, courts continue to grapple with the limits of 
mandatory detention. The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in twice in 
recent decades on the due process implications of immigration detention, 
with starkly different results. In the 2001 decision Zadvydas v. Davis,1 the 
Court avoided a due process problem by construing the statute governing 
detention of individuals with final orders of removal to permit detention 
only so long as removal was reasonably foreseeable, presumptively for no 
longer than six months.2 Two years later, in the post-September 11 
decision Demore v. Kim,3 the Court found no due process violation where 
a lawful permanent resident in removal proceedings, who had not been 
ordered removed, was mandatorily detained for six months without a 
bond hearing.4 This Article explores the aftermath of Demore, which 
 
 1. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 2. Id. at 699. 
 3. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 4. Id. at 528. 
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notably failed to address the civil detention jurisprudence that gave rise 
to Zadvydas. I argue that to give effect to both Demore and Zadvydas, 
courts are correct to read the ambiguous language of the pre-final-order 
mandatory detention statute as imposing temporal limits on mandatory 
detention. I argue further that mandatory detention under this statute 
should never exceed six months, at which time a bond hearing should be 
required. This approach, which the Ninth Circuit recently adopted,5 
draws upon the Supreme Court’s civil detention jurisprudence, the 
decisions of lower courts that have begun to consider the limited nature 
of the Demore decision, and institutional features of the detention and 
removal system. The legacy of Demore confirms that this decision was 
out of step with decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence and that its 
holding is therefore narrow. 
Mandatory detention of people in removal proceedings has led to a 
massive increase in civil immigration detention in the United States. The 
number of people detained on a given day has risen from about 6600 in 
fiscal year 19966 to at least 34,000 in 2012.7 In 2011, the United States 
detained an unprecedented 429,000 people,8 and in fiscal year 2013 the 
federal government spent over $2 billion on immigration detention—about 
$164 per day per person detained.9 
Because immigration judges and the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) view the mandatory detention law as stripping them of 
discretion to determine whether detention is warranted in an individual 
case and to set an appropriate bond,10 mandatory detention bears little 
relation to the goals of immigration enforcement. People who pose neither 
flight risks nor danger to the community are nonetheless confined for 
indeterminate lengths of time, resulting in tremendous hardship to not 
 
 5. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 6. INS: Deportation, Detention, 5 Migration News, no. 6, June 1998, available at 
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more. php?id=1547_0_2_0. 
 7. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 50 
(2012); Press Release, Republican Appropriations Comm., House Approves Fiscal Year 2013 
Homeland Security Appropriations Bill (June 7, 2012), http://appropriations.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=298983. See generally Nat’l Immigration Forum, The Math of 
Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible 
Policies 1–3 (2012), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/ 
mathofimmigrationdetention.pdf. 
 8. John Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of Immigration 
Statistics, Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2011 at 1 (2012). 
 9. Nat’l Immigration Forum, supra note 7, at 3. 
 10. The “custody” required by the mandatory detention statute can and should be construed to 
encompass alternatives to detention. See Memorandum from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n to 
David Martin and Brandon Prelogar, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at 
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=94; Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 601, 632 (2010).  
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only the men and women being detained, but also their families and 
communities. 
This Article revisits Demore and analyzes the recent lower court case 
law exploring limits on prolonged mandatory detention. Part I provides an 
introduction to immigration detention, the mandatory detention statute, 
and the Supreme Court’s immigration detention case law. Part II explains 
the reasoning of Demore and Zadvydas and argues that the Demore Court 
erred, particularly by failing to consider the Salerno line of due process 
jurisprudence. Part III argues that Zadvydas continues to limit the scope 
of mandatory detention and that Demore is limited to its facts. Decisions 
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
recognize limits on prolonged mandatory detention, confirming this view 
of Demore. These cases hold that the mandatory detention statute should 
be read to authorize detention without a bond hearing only for a limited 
period of time. Part IV turns to the question of whether the mandatory 
detention statute should be interpreted to include a bright-line temporal 
limitation on the duration of detention. This Article analyzes the results 
of the Third and Sixth Circuits’ loose multi-factored analysis, which 
contrasts with the clearer six-month limit recently recognized by the Ninth 
Circuit. This Article then argues that the Ninth Circuit’s rule provides the 
better way to reconcile Demore and Zadvydas, both as a matter of 
doctrine and based on the experience of the lower courts and institutional 
features of the removal system. 
I.  Mandatory Detention and the Supreme Court’s Civil 
Detention Jurisprudence 
A. Mandatory Detention and its Consequences 
Courts have interpreted the mandatory detention statute to 
categorically require the detention of non-citizens in removal proceedings 
who have past convictions for any of a remarkably wide range of offenses.11 
For example, simple possession of marijuana and, in some states petty 
theft, can trigger mandatory detention.12 DHS must take individuals into 
 
 11. Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012), provides that 
the “Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who” is inadmissible on any criminal ground 
or deportable on most criminal grounds “when the alien is released.” 
 12. Simple possession of marijuana falls within the “controlled substance offense” ground of 
inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and of deportability, id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (excluding 
“a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana”), and both of 
these grounds trigger mandatory detention. Id. § 1226(c). Some state petty theft convictions are 
treated as “crime[s] involving moral turpitude.” A crime involving moral turpitude triggers mandatory 
detention if the individual is inadmissible (i.e., for someone who was not admitted to the United States 
before being placed in removal proceedings), id. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1226(c)(1)(A), or if the 
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custody “when released” from criminal custody for the underlying offense, 
usually when they have completed any sentence and would otherwise have 
been released.13 The law strips the immigration judge of her power to 
conduct a bond hearing and decide whether the individual poses any 
danger or flight risk, and likewise precludes DHS from making 
discretionary judgments about whether detention is appropriate. 
Since this law was passed, as discussed above, the number of people 
detained on a given day has increased more than five-fold14 and the cost 
of immigration detention has increased accordingly. In fiscal year 2013, 
Congress allocated $2 billion per year for detention, funding 34,000 
detention beds each day.15 Because it requires large-scale imprisonment 
without individual assessments of risk, the mandatory detention regime 
does not effectively serve the goals of immigration detention.16 
“For many noncitizens, detention now represents a deprivation as 
severe as removal itself.”17 Although immigration detention is nominally 
civil, detainees are confined in county jails and other facilities that are 
designed for corrections purposes.18 In an Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) report, Dr. Dora Schriro, a former New York City 
Corrections Commissioner, found that the agency detained individuals in 
unduly restrictive, corrections-like conditions, isolated from their 
families and communities, with inadequate access to law libraries and 
other services, and often intermingled with criminal inmates.19 
 
individual was sentenced to at least one year of imprisonment or was convicted of more than one 
crime involving moral turpitude, id. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B)–(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(ii). 
 13. See id. § 1226(c) ; see also Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on Immigration 
Detention in the United States: Detention and Due Process 85–86 (2010) (“It is important to point 
out that many of the undocumented immigrants with criminal records that ICE detains have already 
served their sentences; therefore, had their legal status been different, they would have been set free.”). 
 14. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 50 
(2012); Press Release, Republican Appropriations Comm., supra note 7. 
 15. Nat’l Immigration Forum, supra note 7, at 2; see also Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Bill, 2013, H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 50 (2012); Press Release, Republican 
Appropriations Comm., supra note 7. 
 16. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42, 48 (July 
2010), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf (footnote 
omitted) (“[E]xisting policies and practices almost certainly have caused overdetention: detention of 
individuals who pose no actual flight risk or danger to public safety or are held under overly restrictive 
circumstances. As custody, bond, and parole decisions increasingly have come to rest on broadly 
defined categoriesfor example, an individual’s prior conviction . . . rather than individualized 
determinations of flight risk or dangerousness, the number of detainees presenting no such risks has 
likely increased, although the precise extent is difficult to ascertain.”). 
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Dora Schriro, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 10 (2009). 
 19. See id. at 4, 21; see also Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 85 (“For those 
cases in which detention is both strictly necessary and proportional, the Inter-American Commission 
insists that immigration detention is an eminently civil matter and the conditions of detention ought 
H - Anello_21 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:38 PM 
368 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:363 
 
Detention separates individuals from their families and deprives 
detainees’ families of income and emotional support.20 Phone calls are 
prohibitively expensive, and jails often limit communication with families 
or attorneys.21 The cumulative effects of these family separations 
reverberate throughout communities, removing productive members of 
the workforce, increasing poverty, and consigning thousands of children to 
foster care.22 
The social isolation and uncertain duration of mandatory immigration 
detention cause well-documented psychological and physical harm. 
“Without any information about or ability to control the fact or terms of 
their confinement,” even previously healthy individuals “develop feelings 
of helplessness and hopelessness that lead to debilitating depressive 
symptoms, chronic anxiety, despair, dread of what may or may not happen 
in the future, as well as [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] and suicidal 
ideation.”23 Detainees are often at risk of repeated physical and mental 
abuse,24 and medical and mental healthcare in detention is often grossly 
inadequate.25  
Detention (particularly when mandatory) also discourages individuals 
from pursuing bona fide challenges to removal because such challenges 
prolong removal proceedings. Moreover, detainees usually do not have 
access to counsel due to an inability to pay attorneys’ fees while in 
detention and the remoteness of most detention facilities from cities with 
pro bono lawyers.26 Detention diminishes people’s chances of prevailing 
 
not to be punitive or prison-like. However, the IACHR observes with concern that this principle is not 
observed in immigration detention in the United States.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Bautista v. Sabol, 862 F. Supp. 2d 375, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“[The detainee’s] 
detention has forced the sale of the family home, caused his lucrative business to go into bankruptcy, 
and has required that his family—including three young children—seek government assistance to 
make ends meet.”). 
 21. Id. at 110, 115–17.   
 22. A recent report by the Applied Research Center estimated that over 5100 children currently 
living in foster care have parents who were either detained or deported and that “in the next five 
years, at least 15,000 more children will face these threats to reunification with their detained and 
deported mothers and fathers.” Seth Freed Wessler, Applied Research Ctr., Shattered Families: 
The Perilous Intersection of Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System 6 (2011). 
 23. Physicians for Human Rights, Punishment Before Justice: Indefinite Detention in the 
US 11 (2011), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/indefinite-detention-june2011.pdf. 
 24. Id. at 17–18.  
 25. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 97–107 (discussing 
“chronically inadequate medical care of immigration detainees” and “even worse” mental healthcare, 
and noting the ratio of one mental health specialist to every 1142 detainees with mental illness, as 
compared to a 1-in-400 ratio in typical federal prisons and a 1-to-10 ratio in prisons for individuals with 
mental illness). 
 26. Id. at 130–32 (footnote omitted). “[C]ustody status (i.e. whether or not [individuals] are 
detained) strongly correlates with their likelihood of obtaining counsel.” Accessing Justice: The 
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings: New York Immigrant Representation 
Study Report: Part I, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 367–73 (2011) (finding that representation rates were 
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in their removal proceedings, even when they have a strong challenge to 
removal.27 
As immigration courts and federal courts of appeals grapple with 
crippling backlogs,28 many people are subject to detention for many 
months or even years.29 As of 2009, about 19,000 people annually were 
detained for over four months, and about 2100 individuals were held for 
more than a year.30 Paradoxically, those who are eligible for asylum, 
cancellation of removal, or other forms of relief—a large proportion of 
whom are lawful permanent residents—typically face more prolonged 
detention than those who are not eligible, since proceedings last longer 
for those who apply for relief from removal.31 Individuals whose cases 
 
lower for individuals detained outside of New York City than those detained therein). “[T]he majority 
of the immigration detention population is housed in facilities in rural locations . . . . Human Rights 
First reports that 4 of the 6 largest immigration detention facilities are 50 or more miles from a major 
urban center.” Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 131. 
 27. See generally infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
 28. In 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft reduced the number of members of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and introduced new procedures for “summary affirmance,” which involves 
affirmance without any discussion of the reason for the Board’s decision. Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”): Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,885, 
54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2003)). As a result, the courts of appeals have seen 
their immigration dockets grow drastically. This has increased the length of time removal appeals 
remain pending. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Summary of Findings and Conclusions (2006), available at 
http://www.dorsey.com/A-Simmering-Border-Dispute---An-ABA-Commissioned-Dorsey-Study-on-
Immigration-Policy-Practice-and-Pro-Bono-is-Cited-in-the-Legal-Times-04-06-2006. Moreover, the 
Second Circuit recently announced that it will toll all deadlines in newly-filed immigration appeals by 
ninety days to encourage the DHS to consider whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion and agree 
to a remand. In re Immigration Petitions, 702 F.3d 160, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 29. See Declaration of Susan B. Long at Ex. A at 6, B-1, Rodriguez v. Holder, 2013 WL 5229795 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (No. 07-3239) [hereinafter Rodriguez Expert Report] (analyzing 460 cases in 
which individuals had been detained six months or longer under INA section 236(c), finding that the 
average detention was 427 days, and documenting detention lasting more than four years); Amnesty 
Int’l, Jailed Without Justice: Immigration Detention in the USA 7 (2009), (“US citizens and lawful 
permanent residents have been incorrectly subject to mandatory detention, and have spent months or 
years behind bars before being able to prove they are not deportable from the United States.”); see, 
e.g., Ali v. Clark, No. 10-0846, 2010 WL 5559393 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2010) (dismissing the 
habeas petition of a legal permanent resident (“LPR”) based on a fifteen-month detention under INA 
section 236(c)), report and recommendation adopted, Ali v. Clark, No. 10-0846, 2011 WL 66024 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 10, 2011); Prince v. Mukasey, 593 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (finding that a legal 
permanent resident’s sixteen-month detention under INA section 236(c) did not violate due process); 
see also Rodriguez Expert Report, supra, at B-1 (finding that, among other broader class of non-
citizens who had been in mandatory detention under any immigration statute for six months or longer, 
78% were detained eight months or longer, 47% for one year or longer, 21% for eighteen months or 
longer, and more than 9% for two years or longer). 
 30. See Kalhan, supra note 16, at 49 (citing Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Migration 
Policy Inst., Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management 
Responsibilities? 16–20 (2009)); see also Schriro, supra note 18, at 6. 
 31. Among a group of people who had been detained pursuant to INA section 236(c) for six 
months or longer, about three quarters had applied for relief from removal. The average duration of 
detention for this subgroup was sixty days longer than the average for individuals who had not applied 
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involve either individual or government appeals are also more likely to 
face prolonged detention.32 Success in challenging removal also correlates 
with prolonged detention.33 
B. Mandatory Detention in Context 
Congress enacted the mandatory detention statute in 1996 as part of 
a package of increasingly punitive and inflexible deportation laws.34 In an 
excellent history of Demore and the mandatory detention provision, 
Margaret Taylor points out that even the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (the “INS”) did not support the mandatory detention law when 
Congress passed it because Congress preferred to retain discretion over 
detention decisions.35 Indeed, the immigration enforcement agency at the 
time was contracting with the Vera Institute of Justice to develop a pilot 
supervision program as a more cost-effective alternative to detention.36 
The 1996 amendments drastically expanded the criminal grounds of 
removability and stripped immigration judges of their discretion to 
award discretionary relief from removal based upon equitable factors.37 
 
for relief. Rodriguez Expert Report, supra note 29, at B-1, B-3. The average duration for individuals 
who had applied for relief is likely under-reported in this study, since it included some people who 
remained in detention.  
 32. Among a class of people held in various forms of mandatory immigration detention for at 
least six months, the average detention time for those whose cases involved only immigration court 
proceedings was 330 days, compared with 448 days for administrative appeals and 667 days for Ninth 
Circuit appeals. Rodriguez Expert Report, supra note 29, at 8.  
 33. In January 2013, the average duration of all proceedings in immigration court was 261 days 
for cases resulting in removal orders and “over two years (839 days)” for cases in which the individuals 
won relief from removal. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Court 
Backlog Continues to Inch Upward in January (2013), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/308. Although these averages include both detained and non-detained cases, the disparity in 
duration between those cases resulting in removal orders and those in which noncitizens prevail 
applies by the same logic to both detained and non-detained subsets of this population. See Heeren, 
supra note 10, at 629 (discussing mandatory detention of those people “who are found to be properly 
deportable and ineligible for all discretionary relief from removal, but still win CAT relief for 
withholding of removal,” and noting that “[t]hese immigrants, who fear death, imprisonment, or 
torture in their native countries, have a strong incentive to win their removal case”). 
 34. See, e.g., Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in 
Immigration Stories 343, 348–49 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); Alice E. Loughran, 
Congress, Categories, and the Constitution—Whether Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens Violates 
Due Process, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 681, 681–83 (2004). 
 35. Taylor, supra note 34, at 351–52. 
 36. Id. at 351–53. 
 37. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated felony” to include drug trafficking 
offenses and certain theft and fraud offenses, among many others); id. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B) 
(prohibiting asylum from being granted to individuals with aggravated felony convictions or individuals 
who apply more than one year after entering United States); id. § 1182(a)(2) (listing criminal grounds of 
inadmissibility); id. § 1182(h) (saying discretionary waivers are not available to individuals with most 
drug-related convictions); id. § 1227(a)(2) (listing criminal grounds of deportability); id. § 1229b 
(restricting the cancellation of removal as not available to individuals with aggravated felony 
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For all of these reasons, as the Supreme Court recently recognized in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, “if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense 
after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is 
practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of 
equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal 
for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses.”38 
With the introduction of a broad mandatory detention regime, the 
detention of many non-citizens during removal proceedings became 
practically inevitable as well. Such detention is often prolonged. Even 
under the 1996 regime, many individuals have had lengthy removal 
proceedings and appeals due to the complexity of determining the 
immigration consequences of criminal convictions, or due to adjudication 
of applications for the limited forms of relief from removal that may be 
available to individuals with criminal convictions. 
The 1996 amendments also provided for detention after an order of 
removal had become final—that is, after all administrative appeals had 
been exhausted or waived. The Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
“INA”) section 241(a)(2) mandates detention for the first ninety days 
after any type of removal order becomes final.39 INA section 241(a)(6)—
the statute at issue in Zadvydas v. Davis—provides that the DHS has 
discretion to detain individuals after the ninety-day removal period.40 
C. ZADVYDAS and DEMORE 
In 2001 and 2003, the Supreme Court took two very different 
approaches to considering due process problems raised by civil 
immigration detention. In the 2001 case Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court 
 
convictions)); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (withholding of removal not available to individual with “particularly 
serious crime”); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362–62 (2010). Juliet Stumpf has argued that 
criminal and immigration law are converging into a new field of “crimmigration.” See generally Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 
(2006). 
 38. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 362–63; see Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction 
of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 47, 79 (2010). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 
 40. Id. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this 
title [8 U.S.C.], removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who 
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply 
with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be 
subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).”). Similarly, the 1996 amendment provided for 
mandatory detention (with the narrow exception that DHS could release an individual on “parole”) 
during “expedited removal” proceedings, a procedure that permits DHS to remove most individuals 
intercepted at the border without affording them a right to court proceedings. Id. § 1225. Individuals 
with aggravated felonies can also be subject to administrative removal, meaning that the agency 
prosecuting their removal case could order them removed without an opportunity for a full hearing 
before an immigration judge. Id. § 1228. 
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recognized that due process limits the executive’s power to detain non-
citizens in connection with civil removal proceedings.41 Although the case 
addressed detention after a removal order had become final, the Court 
relied upon basic due process principles that have become critical to 
courts’ assessment of whether there is any limit to mandatory detention 
while a case is still pending.42 
The Zadvydas Court confronted a statutory and due process 
challenge to the executive’s practice of indefinitely detaining individuals 
who had final orders of removal but who could not actually be deported. 
This group of people includes individuals who are stateless or who 
cannot prove their citizenship, and citizens of countries that lack general 
repatriation agreements with the United States, such as Cuba. Petitioner 
Kestutis Zadvydas could not be removed because he was stateless, 
having been born to Lithuanian parents in a displaced persons’ camp in 
Germany.43 Before being ordered released by a district court, he had 
been detained for about three years.44 Kim Ho Ma, the other individual 
whose case was reviewed in Zadvydas, could not be removed because he 
was a Cambodian citizen and Cambodia and the United States did not 
have a repatriation treaty.45 
The Zadvydas Court addressed the question of whether INA 
section 241(a)(6), the discretionary provision of the post-removal period 
detention statute, authorized detention beyond the removal period for 
individuals with final removal orders who could not be removed.46 
Immigration enforcement officials argued that this statute, which does 
not articulate the permissible duration of post-final-order detention, 
authorized detention for an indefinite time even when the non-citizen 
could not be removed.47 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer rejected 
this construction, holding that the language of the statute was ambiguous 
on this point and that a statute permitting such indefinite detention 
would raise “a serious constitutional problem.”48 
The Court rested its decision on the United States v. Salerno line of 
due process cases, making clear that immigration detention was subject 
to the same due process limits as other forms of civil detention.49 Salerno 
 
 41. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 684. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 686. 
 46. Id. at 688–89. 
 47. Id. at 689. 
 48. Id. at 690. 
 49. See Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 339, 345 (2002) 
(arguing that in Zadvydas, the “Court seems not to have cut the government any more slack than in 
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and its progeny, discussed in greater detail below, establish that 
government detention violates due process “unless the detention is 
ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, 
or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances,’ where a 
special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the 
‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.’”50 The Court determined that the executive’s stated justifications 
in Zadvydas—ensuring appearance at future removal proceedings and 
avoiding danger to the community—did not justify the deprivation of 
liberty. “[W]here detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, 
detention no longer ‘bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual [was] committed.’”51 The Court also held that 
“preventive detention based on dangerousness” was constitutional “only 
when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong 
procedural protections.”52 
Because the detention at issue was potentially indefinite and the 
procedural protections weak, and because the statute permitted detention 
of people who had been admitted to the United States, indefinite post-
order detention raised a serious due process problem. The Court therefore 
held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued 
detention is no longer authorized by statute.”53 
Two years after Zadvydas, however, the Court upheld mandatory 
detention for individuals in removal proceedings under INA 
 
other administrative contexts; in other words, it seems to have stepped out of the discourse of 
immigration exceptionalism, with a result to match”). 
 50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (emphasis omitted) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 
(1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 
 51. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). 
 52. Id. at 691. 
 53. Id. at 699. In response to Zadvydas, the former INS promulgated regulations that provide for 
administrative custody reviews at 90 and 180 days after a final order of removal, and for every six 
months thereafter. See generally Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 
8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2013). Many individuals in removal proceedings have filed habeas petitions seeking 
release under Zadvydas. This challenging procedure can result in either release or a faster deportation 
process since the agency can avoid granting the petition by showing a “significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Some individuals 
nevertheless remain in detention longer than six months after a final removal order. See, e.g., Atanda 
v. Clark, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (holding that the individual was properly detained 
almost three years after the BIA affirmed his removal order because his removal was reasonably 
foreseeable). Balicudiong-Asican v. Kane, No. 09-0018, 2009 WL 3157223 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2009) 
(holding that the individual was properly detained sixteen months after the BIA affirmed his removal 
order because his removal was reasonably foreseeable); Cacatzun-Sop v. Clark, No. 08-1225, 2008 WL 
5100209 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2008) (holding that the individual was properly detained eighteen 
months after his removal proceeding became administratively final because his removal was 
reasonably foreseeable). Moreover, some people remain in indefinite detention pursuant to the DHS’s 
position that they are “specially dangerous individuals”a group that the Zadvydas Court noted but 
did not have occasion to address. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691. 
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section 236(c). This section of the statute provides that the “Attorney 
General shall take into custody any alien who” is removable on almost any 
criminal ground54 “when the alien is released.”55 The statute does not 
permit bond hearings or any other individualized determination of flight 
risk or danger to the community. 
Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Demore, and 
Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote.56 In the brief majority opinion, 
the Court dismissed the respondent’s due process claims with little 
constitutional analysis. After a preliminary holding on jurisdiction, the 
Court turned to an extended discussion of the dangers posed by the 
government’s perceived inability to deport “criminal aliens” without 
mandatory detention.57 It emphasized the “wholesale failure by the INS 
to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens,”58 the growth 
in the number of non-citizens in federal and state prisons,59 the INS’s 
inability to identify or remove most “criminal aliens,”60 and the frequency 
of illegal reentry and recidivism among non-citizens with criminal 
convictions.61 The Court found that “Congress also had before it 
evidence that one of the major causes of the INS’ failure to remove 
deportable criminal aliens was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens 
during their deportation proceedings.”62 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court made no mention of other facts that were critical to understanding 
the low rate of immigration enforcement. For example, at that time the 
INS had not yet instituted a systematic program to encourage 
appearance and removal through intensive individual supervision.63 
 
 54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513, 531 (2003). 
 57. Id. at 518. 
 58. Id. (citing Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings 
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 104th Cong. (1995); S. Rep. No. 104-48, pt. 1 
(1995)). 
 59. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 519 (citing Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., Deportation of Aliens After Final Orders Have Been Issued, Rep. No. I-
96-03 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 123 (1995)); see id. at 519 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-48, pt. 1, at 2 
(1995)) (finding that “[o]nce released, more than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear 
for their removal hearings,” but noting that the dissent disputed this figure). 
 63. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Vera Inst. of 
Justice, Testing Community Supervision for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance 
Assistance Program ii, 33, 36 (2000)) (noting that the majority failed to cite a Vera Institute study 
showing “that 92% of criminal aliens (most of whom were [Legal Permanent Residents]) who were 
released under supervisory conditions attended all of their hearings”); see also Taylor, supra note 34, 
at 352. 
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While recognizing that it “is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings,”64 Demore also emphasized the political branches’ plenary 
power over deportation. Citing to a one hundred-year-old decision, 
Demore held that the Court had recognized “detention during deportation 
proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”65 
The Court went on to ground its brief due process analysis in two unusual 
pre-Zadvydas cases,66 and distinguished Zadvydas based upon the shorter 
duration of detention and the fact that removal of the petitioners in 
Zadvydas was “no longer practically attainable.”67 The Court concluded 
that the respondent’s detention was permissible on the basis of a 
categorical rule rather than individualized determinations of flight risk and 
dangerousness.68 
Justice Kennedy concurred and wrote separately to emphasize that 
his decision hinged on the understanding that an individual in mandatory 
detention was entitled to a hearing on whether the individual’s criminal 
history corresponded with the categories in the mandatory detention 
statute, and on his view that the respondent’s detention had been 
sufficiently brief.69 “Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in 
pursuing and completing deportation proceedings,” he wrote, “it could 
become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate 
deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to 
incarcerate for other reasons.”70 
Justices Souter and Breyer authored opinions concurring in the 
jurisdictional holding and dissenting as to the holding that the respondent’s 
mandatory detention was constitutional. Justice Souter wrote an extensive 
rebuttal to the majority opinion. He argued: 
[The] Court’s holding that the Constitution permits the Government to 
lock up a lawful permanent resident of this country when there is 
concededly no reason to do so forgets over a century of precedent 
acknowledging the rights of permanent residents, including the basic 
liberty from physical confinement lying at the heart of due process.71 
Souter also pointed to other fundamental factual and legal errors. For 
example, the majority placed great weight on the assertion that Kim had 
 
 64. Demore, 538 U.S. at 523 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). 
 65. Id. (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)). 
 66. Id. at 523–26 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 
(1993)). Carlson and Flores are discussed in Part II, infra. 
 67. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–30. 
 68. See id. at 555–56 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 69. Id. at 531–32 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 532–33. 
 71. Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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conceded deportability, ignoring the more complex facts of his case.72 
Indeed, even the dissenters glossed over the basic structure of 
immigration proceedings, assuming that an individual’s concession that 
he was “deportable” was equivalent to a concession that he had no way 
to prevail at his removal proceedings, when in fact some people who are 
deportable ultimately win relief from removal.73 Additionally, Justice 
Souter pointed out that the majority overstated the significance of the 
studies that Congress had cited as showing a need for mandatory detention 
and failed to mention another study that established that a supervision 
program could successfully address flight risk concerns.74 He also discussed 
the majority’s disregard for civil detention jurisprudence more generally, 
which is addressed below. 
II.  DEMORE’s Divergence from ZADVYDAS and Earlier Civil 
Detention Jurisprudence 
The Demore majority’s approach differed in significant ways from 
Zadvydas and its predecessors. The shift in doctrine reflected the political 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Following the 
attacks, the George W. Bush administration profiled and preventatively 
detained large numbers of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian men, 
often by initiating removal proceedings against them.75 Although the 
respondent in Demore was not accused of any terrorism-related offenses, 
the Court’s emphasis on Congress’s public safety concerns, along with 
the Bush administration’s use of immigration detention for investigatory 
or preventative purposes indicates a concern for preserving the 
 
 72. Id. at 514. 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 576 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If I believed . . . that 
Kim had conceded that he is deportable, then I would conclude that the Government could detain him 
without bail for the few weeks ordinarily necessary for formal entry of a removal order.”). 
 74. Id. at 564–66 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the “Court 
does not explain how the INS’s resource-driven decisions to release individuals who pose serious flight 
risks, and their predictable failure to attend removal hearings, could justify a systemwide denial of any 
opportunity for release to individuals like Kim who are neither flight risks nor threats to the public” 
and discussing a Vera Institute study establishing the effectiveness of alternatives to detention). 
 75. Taylor, supra note 34, at 365; see Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and 
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is 
Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 609, 621–22 (2005) (footnotes 
omitted) (“On orders by the Attorney General to use ‘every available law enforcement tool’ to arrest 
persons who ‘participate in, or lend support to, terrorist activities,’ law enforcement focused on using 
federal immigration laws to arrest and detain noncitizens suspected of any terrorist ties. More than 
1200 citizens and noncitizens were detained for interrogation within the first two months of the 
attacks. Although many were questioned and released with no charges pressed against them, many 
were detained for immigration law violations.”). 
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administration’s ability to detain people without hearings for national 
security purposes.76 
Demore omitted mention of seminal civil detention decisions. 
Notably, the Court recognized in cases preceding Demore that “[f]reedom 
from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,” and that 
“commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of 
liberty that requires due process protection.”77 Since the late 1800s, and 
again in Zadvydas, the Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause 
limits immigration detention just as it limits other forms of civil detention.78 
The Court has examined civil detention in other contexts such as 
pretrial detention,79 civil commitment based upon mental illness and 
findings that an individual is “sexually dangerous,”80 and detention for 
failure to pay child support.81 Prior to Demore, the Court had never 
approved of mandatory, categorical civil detention outside of wartime.82 As 
Justice Souter concluded in his opinion in Demore, the earlier civil 
detention cases established that due process “calls for an individual 
 
 76. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three Years After 
September 11: A New New World?, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 815, 834 (2005) (“The real clash in Kim was 
over very different conceptions of the value of liberty, specifically the extent to which the justices 
would tolerate restrictions for resident aliens that they would not brook for citizens. One cannot read 
the language of liberty in Zadvydas and Kim without concluding that there was a shift in the Court in 
the two years after Zadvydasthe two years immediately after September 11.”). See generally Taylor, 
supra note 34. 
 77. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[A]ll persons within the territory of 
the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by th[e] amendments, and [] even aliens 
shall not be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”); see David Cole, In 
Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1016 (2002); id. at 
1023 (“[T]he Court has applied the same general due process analysis to all preventive detention, 
including preventive detention that is likely to be much more short-lived than that imposed on aliens 
in removal proceedings.”). See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation.”). 
 79. E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) 
(preventative juvenile pretrial detention); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (applying the Fourth 
Amendment to post-arrest detention). 
 80. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); Foucha, 504 U.S. 71; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 81. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 82. See Cole, supra note 78, at 1009–10 (“Outside of wartime, no Justice on the Court has even 
argued for civil detention in the absence of an individualized finding that the detention is necessary to 
protect against a distinct danger posed by the individual sought to be detained.”); see also Demore v. 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 549 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Salerno, 
481 U.S. at 755) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.”). 
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determination before someone is locked away,” rather than a categorical 
determination.83 
In its due process case law, the Court has emphasized the 
importance of a high substantive standard. Civil commitment, for 
example, required a showing of not only danger to society, but also 
mental illness or a comparable additional factor.84 Indeed, several of the 
state civil detention statutes that were upheld required the government 
attorney to show that detention was the least restrictive means to protect 
the public.85 A statute that categorically requires detention based upon 
past acts and affords decisionmakers no authority to consider evidence of 
rehabilitation or the minor nature of past crimes is out of step with this 
rigorous approach. Relying upon a categorical proxy for flight risk and 
dangerousness, rather than a direct, individualized analysis of these 
factors, does not effectively allocate government resources to ensure 
removal or protect the community.86 
The Court’s civil detention case law also emphasizes that due process 
requires that the government bear the burden of proving the need for 
detention, at least by the intermediate “clear and convincing” evidence 
standard of proof (which is higher than a preponderance, but lower than 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”).87 The mandatory detention provisions, as 
currently implemented, do not meet this requirement. Although the 
standard for determining whether an individual had a qualifying conviction 
for purposes of the mandatory detention statute was not addressed in 
Demore, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) had previously 
 
 83. Demore, 538 U.S. at 551 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 84. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75–76 (citation omitted) (“[T]o commit an individual to a mental 
institution in a civil proceeding, the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence . . . that the person sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires 
hospitalization for his own welfare and protection of others.”); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346–47 
(citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 314–15) (“Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if it 
couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or 
‘mental abnormality.’”).  
 85. Heller, 509 U.S. at 312, 318 (upholding a civil commitment scheme that required government 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that individuals were “mentally retarded or mentally ill 
individuals who present a threat of danger to themselves, family, or others, who can reasonably benefit 
from the available treatment, and for whom the least restrictive alternative is placement in the relevant 
facility” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1982)) (explaining that the Bail Reform Act limits the circumstances under which 
detention may be sought); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 549–50 (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 86. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (“[In answering] whether the detention is, or 
is not, pursuant to statutory authority. . . . [T]he habeas court must ask whether the detention in 
question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness 
primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment 
of removal.”). 
 87. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1979). 
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addressed this issue. The Board had construed a detention regulation to 
require detention of anyone alleged to be subject to mandatory detention 
unless the immigration judge was “convinced that the [INS] is substantially 
unlikely to prevail on its charge.”88 Indeed, the Board suggested that the 
INS would not even have to produce a certified conviction record at the 
initial hearing in order to hold an individual in mandatory detention.89 This 
decision effectively put the burden of proof on the individual rather than 
the government, and did not require a heightened standard of proof. 
The Court has also emphasized the importance of “strict procedural 
safeguards.”90 Virtually all of the civil detention schemes to come before 
the Court have involved individualized assessments and adversarial 
hearings before a judge.91 The non-wartime civil detention schemes that 
the Court has upheld also involved proceedings in which individuals had 
a right to appointed counsel or where the individual before the court in 
an as-applied challenge had counsel.92 Under current BIA precedent, the 
very limited “Joseph hearing” afforded to people who wish to challenge 
their classification as mandatory detainees involves no right to appointed 
counsel and is not transcribed, which makes it difficult to appeal.93 Because 
 
 88. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 807 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997). 
 91. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315–16 (1993) (upholding scheme that involved three 
judicial hearings with appointed counsel and examination by two mental health professionals); 
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86 (overturning decision to extend civil commitment of petitioner who was not 
found to be mentally ill, but only dangerous, in proceeding in which burden was unconstitutionally 
placed on individual seeking release); Addington, 441 U.S. at 420 (striking down scheme that involved 
examinations by mental health professionals and six-day hearing based upon insufficiently high 
standard of proof); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731–39 (1972) (striking down a statute that 
permitted indefinite detention of an individual who was deemed incompetent to proceed in criminal 
trial after examination by two psychiatrists and hearing with counsel); Greenwood v. United States, 
350 U.S. 366 (1956) (applying the Necessary and Proper Clause to uphold federal civil detention of 
individual who was deemed incompetent and dangerous after multiple psychiatric evaluations and a 
competency hearing at which he was represented by counsel); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate 
Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 271–272 (1940) (upholding state statute permitting commitment 
of dangerous person with “psychopathic personality” following court hearing). 
 92. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 316 (“Upon filing of the petition, the trial court must appoint 
counsel to represent the individual in question, unless he retains private counsel.”); Greenwood, 
350 U.S. at 371 (counsel appointed for petitioner); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 272 
(upholding a statute acknowledging the right to counsel); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 
2520 (2011) (holding that civil detention for failure to pay child support violates Due Process because 
petitioner “received neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures”); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 
114 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Throughout these proceedings, Foucha was represented by state-
appointed counsel.”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 420 (“Appellant retained counsel and a trial was held 
before a jury.”); Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718 (“A competency hearing was subsequently held at which 
petitioner was represented by counsel.”). 
 93. See generally Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially Unlikely”: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, 26 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 65 (2011). 
H - Anello_21 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:38 PM 
380 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:363 
 
the judge cannot make any individualized assessments of danger or flight 
risk, and the BIA’s governing standard is deferential to the immigration 
prosecutor, a Joseph hearing typically involves very minimal process. 
The Court has recognized the need for procedural and substantive 
standards that accord with the serious and often irreparable harm that a 
longer period of detention may cause an individual and her family. As 
the Court has recognized in other contexts, prolonged detention “may 
imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his 
family relationships.”94 A recent civil detention decision, Turner v. 
Rogers,95 confirms that the Salerno line of cases still governs civil 
detention. Turner held that detention for civil contempt of court based 
on failure to pay child support must be accompanied by counsel or other 
strong procedural protections.96 
The Demore majority did not cite Salerno or other seminal civil 
detention cases.97 Instead, the Court supported its holding with two 
outlying due process cases. First, it cited Carlson v. Landon,98 which 
involved a statute under which the Attorney General had discretion to 
detain members of the Communist Party during their removal 
proceedings.99 Carlson is a troubling decision, but unlike Demore, it did 
not involve a mandatory detention statute.100 More importantly, it is an 
outlier in the civil detention jurisprudence. It is a product of the 
McCarthy era, with its parallels to the racial, ethnic, and religious 
profiling of the post-September 11 period.101 Its approach to due process 
is not consistent with the intervening due process cases discussed above. 
Second, the Court cited Reno v. Flores,102 which similarly did not 
support the constitutionality of a mandatory detention scheme. Flores 
involved the choice of placement for juveniles who did not contest the 
 
Demore did not have occasion to address the sufficiency of the Joseph standard since the Court found 
that Kim had waived his right to a Joseph hearing. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003). 
 94. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (citation omitted); see Wessler, supra note 22, at 22–27. 
 95. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 96. Id. at 2520. 
 97. Taylor, supra note 34, at 364. 
 98. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
 99. Id. at 526–28. 
 100. See id. at 528 n.5 (1952) (citing Internal Security Act of 1950, § 23, 8 U.S.C. § 156) (“Pending 
final determination of the deportability of any alien taken into custody under warrant of the Attorney 
General, such alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be 
released under bond in the amount of not less than $500, with security approved by the Attorney 
General; or (3) be released on conditional parole.”); id. at 541–42 (citation omitted) (“There is no 
evidence or contention that all persons arrested as deportable under § 22 of the Internal Security Act . . . 
for Communist membership are denied bail. In fact, a report filed with this Court by the Department of 
Justice in this case at our request shows allowance of bail in the large majority of cases.”). 
 101. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 573–74 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 102. 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
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INS’s power to maintain custody over them.103 The juveniles also received 
immigration court hearings regarding their placements. The case does not 
speak to the question of whether an individual may constitutionally be 
detained without a bond hearing.104 
Notably, although the Demore majority distinguished Zadvydas based 
upon the duration of detention and the fact that detaining someone whose 
removal is “no longer practically attainable” does not serve the goals of 
immigration detention,105 it did not mention a distinction that cut the other 
way; that whereas the Zadvydas petitioners had final orders of removal, 
the respondent in Demore did not have a final order (although he had 
conceded deportability106), and indeed still had lawful permanent resident 
status.107 As Justice Souter emphasized, the Court has long held that 
lawful permanent residents are entitled to a very high level of due 
process, approaching that afforded citizens.108 A significant percentage of 
individuals in removal proceedings are lawful permanent residents.109 
 
 103. Id. at 299–300. 
 104. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 575–76 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 105. Id. at 511 (majority opinion). 
 106. Demore rested on the assumption that the petitioner had conceded “deportability,” id. at 514, 
and did not reach the question of whether someone who had not conceded deportability could be 
mandatorily detained consistent with due process. The term “deportable,” as used in section 236(c) 
and throughout the INA, refers to the preliminary determination that DHS has grounds for deporting 
an individual (for example, that the individual has been convicted of a qualifying criminal offense), as 
distinct from the question of whether the individual qualifies for relief such as asylum or withholding, 
deferral, or cancellation of removal. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) (grounds of deportability) with 
id. § 1229a(c)(4) (“Applications for relief from removal”). Thus, the fact that Petitioner Kim had 
conceded deportability did not mean that he would necessarily be removed at the conclusion of 
proceedings. See Taylor, supra note 34, at 356–57. 
 107. See, e.g., Samantha M. Brock, Demore v. Kim: A Divided Supreme Court Upholds Lesser Due 
Process, 10 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 137, 174 (2004) (citing Brief for Law Faculty as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 01-1491) (“On its face 
this seems an astonishing assertion: those who are merely accused should have fewer protections than 
this against whom a final determination has been rendered.”)). 
 108. See generally Taylor, supra note 34 (noting mandatory detention’s disproportionate impact on 
lawful permanent residents); Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The Court’s holding . . . forgets over a century of precedent acknowledging the rights of 
permanent residents, including the basic liberty from physical confinement lying at the heart of due 
process.”). 
 109. DHS does not publish annual numbers of lawful permanent residents whom it has deported 
or placed in removal proceedings. However, a 2010 study based on Freedom of Information Act data 
estimated that ICE arrested 7200 green card holders in New York City between 2005 and 2010. This 
figure is more than one-fifth of total ICE arrests in New York during that period. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law Immigrant Rights Clinic et al., Insecure Communities, Devastated Families: New Data on 
Immigrant Detention and Deportation Practices in New York City 7 (2012), available at 
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf. 
Human Rights Watch has reported that 9.8 percent of people actually deported between April 1997 
and August 2007 were lawful permanent residents. Human Rights Watch, Forced Apart (By the 
Numbers) 6 tbl. 4 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/04/15/forced-apart-numbers. 
Lawful permanent residency is a threshold requirement for certain forms of relief from removal, so 
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Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a lawful permanent resident 
does not lose the benefit of that status until he is actually ordered 
removed and the order becomes administratively final following 
affirmation by the BIA or a waiver of appeal rights.110 As Justice Souter 
observed in his dissent, the Demore majority passed over decades of due 
process case law recognizing the heightened due process rights of lawful 
permanent residents as comparable to those of citizens.111 
Likewise, in emphasizing that mandatory detention during 
proceedings ensured future appearances while detention of someone 
whose removal was not attainable did not serve an immigration-related 
purpose, the majority overlooked the subset of mandatory detainees who 
will ultimately win relief from removal112 and gain or retain permission to 
remain in the United States. Indeed, even individuals whose removals 
will not be “practically attainable”—such as most Cuban citizens and 
stateless individuals—are routinely subjected to mandatory detention 
during proceedings. Detention of individuals who will win relief from 
removal (for example, asylum), or whose removal is otherwise not likely 
to be legally or practically attainable does not serve the purpose of 
enforcing the immigration laws113 
 
lawful permanent residents likely win deportation challenges (and face prolonged proceedings) more 
often than other individuals. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1229b(a) (2012).  
 110. Demore, 538 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1.1(p) (2002)) (“He may therefore claim the due process to which a lawful permanent resident is 
entitled.”). Justice Souter also points out that even the dissenting Justices in Zadvydas, who would 
have approved indefinite post-final-order detention, supported their argument by emphasizing that the 
population at issue in Zadvydas had no right to remain in the United States. Id. at 554–55. 
 111. See id. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (“Some 
individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious challenges to removability or claims for relief 
from removal. As to such aliens, as with Zadvydas and Ma, the Government has only a weak reason 
under the immigration laws for detaining them.” ); see also id. at 560–61 (“While there are differences 
between detention pending removal proceedings (this case) and detention after entry of a removal 
order (Zadvydas), the differences merely point up that Kim’s is the stronger claim.”); see, e.g., Taylor, 
supra note 34; Weisselberg, supra note 76. 
 112. Notably, Demore addressed an individual who (according to the Court) had conceded 
removability and was seeking withholding of removal. The Court did not address the BIA’s standard 
for determining whether an individual is subject to mandatory detention under In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999). Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3; see Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1020–
21 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 113. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28 (“[D]etention of deportable criminal aliens pending their 
removal proceedings . . . necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from 
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, 
the aliens will be successfully removed.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001) (The basic 
purpose of post-removal detention is “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal. Thus, if 
removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no 
longer authorized.”); Kalhan, supra note 16, at 44 (“[D]etention and other forms of custody are 
constitutionally permissible to prevent individuals from fleeing or endangering public safety.”). 
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The majority also did not address the fact that as a practical matter, 
detention can constitute an even more serious deprivation for individuals 
still fighting their removal cases than for those with final orders. Being 
detained during removal proceedings greatly diminishes the likelihood of 
success.114 Immigration law is extremely complicated, particularly in cases 
that involve questions of the immigration consequences of criminal 
convictions. Most people in detention must represent themselves due to a 
lack of money to hire an attorney and a dearth of access to pro bono 
counsel, whereas those not in detention are more likely to have access to 
counsel.115 Efforts to fight a complicated legal case without an attorney are 
further complicated by detention in remote facilities that are far from 
family members and evidence, and by the exorbitant costs of phone calls 
to family members.116 A detainee’s knowledge that he or she will not 
receive an individualized bond hearing even weighs against pursuing 
meritorious claims. 
III.  DEMORE in the Circuit Courts: Recognizing Temporal Limits 
In the brief period between Zadvydas and Demore, every appellate 
court to address the constitutionality of mandatory detention held that it 
violated due process.117 Since Demore, lower courts have endeavored to 
 
 114. See Accessing Justice, supra note 26, at 363–64. Represented individuals with LPR-related 
cases were thirty-two percent more successful than their underrepresented counterparts; those 
represented individuals with non-LPR-related cases were thirty-eight percent more successful than 
their underrepresented counterparts. Id. at 385. Moreover, the “likelihood of filing an application for 
relief [for example, for asylum or Convention Against Torture relief] is highly correlated with having 
legal counsel and with custody status. . . . Ninety-five percent to 98% of nondetained individuals 
before New York Immigration Courts who filed applications for relief were represented.” Id. at 379. 
 115. “More than half of respondents in removal proceedings, and 84% of detained respondents, do 
not have representation. The lack of adequate representation diminishes the prospects of fair 
adjudication for the noncitizen, delays and raises the costs of proceedings, calls into question the 
fairness of a convoluted and complicated process, and exposes noncitizens to the risk of abuse and 
exploitation by ‘immigration consultants’ and ‘notarios.’” Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Immigration, 
Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, 
and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases ES-7 (2010); see Joan Friedland, 
Immigration Policy Center, Falling Through the Cracks: How Gaps in ICE’s Prosecutorial 
Discretion Policies Affect Immigrants Without Legal Representation 5 (2012) (finding that of the 
individuals detained, roughly eighty-four percent are unrepresented). 
 116. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 110 (footnote omitted) (concluding 
that “ICE’s history when it comes to providing free, low-cost telephone service to immigrant detainees 
has been deplorable” and observing that ICE’s contract with telephone service provider “does not 
contain any penalties for inadequate connectivity, excessive charges or other problems, despite the 
fact that with this system the company has no incentive to provide quality service”); see Demore v. 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[D]etention prior 
to entry of a removal order may well impede the alien’s ability to develop and present his case on the 
very issue of removability.”). 
 117. E.g., Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002); Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 
2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001); 
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implement the Supreme Court’s holding in a way that is most consistent 
with the due process principles recognized in Zadvydas and its 
predecessors. Some courts and the BIA have recognized limitations 
related to the likelihood that an individual will be found removable118 and 
to the amount of time that has passed since release from criminal custody 
for a removable offense.119 In addition, all three appellate courts that 
have decided challenges to prolonged mandatory immigration detention 
have held that the mandatory detention statute does not authorize either 
“prolonged” detention without a bond hearing or durations of detention 
without a bond hearing that are not “reasonable.”120 
 
see also Taylor, supra note 34, at 365. The Seventh Circuit had upheld the mandatory detention 
statute, but it issued this decision before Zadvydas. See generally Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
 118. E.g., In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding that an individual is subject to 
mandatory detention unless he or she can prove he or she is “substantially unlikely to prevail”). The 
Joseph standard has been criticized, particularly because it places the burden of proof on the 
individual being detained. See Dona, supra note 93, at 66–67. 
 119. See, e.g., In re Garcia Arreola, 25 I. & N. Dec. 267, 271 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that individuals 
released from criminal custody for removable offense prior to 1998 effective date of INA 
section 236(c) are not subject to mandatory detention). The idea of subjecting individuals to 
mandatory detention based upon convictions for which they were released prior to the effective date 
of the mandatory detention statute also raises serious due process concerns. Relatedly, many courts 
have held that because the statute instructs DHS to take an individual into custody “when released” 
from criminal custody, it governs detention only if the individual was taken into ICE custody right 
after being released from criminal custody for an enumerated offense. See, e.g., Bogarin-Flores v. 
Napolitano, No. 12-0399, 2012 WL 3283287, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012); Rianto v. Holder, No. 11-
0137, 2011 WL 3489613, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2011); Sylvain v. Holder, No. 11-3006, 2011 WL 
2580506, at *6 (D.N.J. June 28, 2011) (“Most District Courts considering the issue have rejected the 
BIA’s interpretation of § 1226(c)(1) in Matter of Rojas.”); Oscar v. Gillen, 595 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (D. 
Mass. 2009); Bromfield v. Clark, No. 06-0757, 2007 WL 527511, at *45 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2007); 
Boonkue v. Ridge, No. 04-0566, 2004 WL 1146525, at *2 (D. Or. May 7, 2004) (finding that the 
individual was not subject to mandatory detention because he was not taken into custody until five 
years after being released from state custody); Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1231 
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (“[M]andatory detention statute, INA § 236(c), does not apply to aliens who have 
been taken into immigration custody several months or several years after they have been released 
from state custody.”); Pastor-Camarena v. Smith, 977 F. Supp. 1415, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“The 
plain meaning of [§ 236(c)] is that it applies immediately after release from incarceration, not to aliens 
released many year earlier.”); see also Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. 05-03335, 2005 WL 3157377, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (“Department of Homeland Security need not act immediately but has a 
reasonable period of time after release from incarceration in which to detain.”). The BIA and two 
circuit courts, however, have interpreted this language to permit commencement of mandatory 
detention after time has passed since release from criminal custody. See Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 
150, 161 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
117, 122 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 120. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “when detention 
becomes prolonged, § 1226(c) becomes inapplicable”); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding that INA section 236(c) “authorizes only mandatory detention that is 
reasonable in length”); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) (construing “the pre-removal 
detention statute to include an implicit requirement that removal proceedings be concluded within a 
reasonable time”). 
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Both Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Demore rest on the idea that mandatory detention under 
INA section 236(c) is typically brief. The majority stated that mandatory 
detention is authorized for “the brief period necessary for [Kim’s] 
removal proceedings,” which had lasted six months at the time of the 
decision,121 and distinguished Zadvydas in part on the basis that “the 
detention here is of a much shorter duration.”122 The Court held that “the 
detention at stake under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a 
half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five 
months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.”123 
Justice Kennedy made clear in his concurrence that the Court was not 
finding that section 236(c) would authorize a longer period of detention, 
stating that because “the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as 
respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his 
risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 
unreasonable or unjustified.”124 This emphasis on the temporally limited 
nature of mandatory detention has become an important tool for limiting 
Demore in the lower courts. 
A. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has “addressed the question of how broadly 
Demore sweeps in several decisions over the past decade” and has 
“consistently held that Demore’s holding is limited to detentions of brief 
duration.”125 The Ninth Circuit’s initial post-Demore decisions arose in 
the context of as-applied challenges involving extremely long periods of 
detention, whereas more recent cases provided an opportunity for the 
Circuit to truly limit Demore to its facts. The Circuit recently adopted a 
rule that, as this Article argues, strikes respects disparate strains of 
Supreme Court doctrine while also reflecting institutional realities: any 
immigration detention lasting six months or longer requires a bond 
hearing.126 
 
 121. Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. 
 122. Id. at 528. 
 123. Id. at 530. This statistic was criticized at the time Demore was decided and is even less accurate 
today, as the durations of immigration proceedings have increased. See generally Taylor, supra note 34; 
see also Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 33 (explaining in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2013, the average duration of proceedings was 261 days for cases resulting in removal orders 
and more than two years, or 839 days for cases in which respondents won relief). 
 124. Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
684–86 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[A]liens are entitled to be free from detention that is 
arbitrary or capricious.”)). 
 125. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1137. 
 126. Id. at 1143. 
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First, in a fact-specific 2005 decision,127 the court held that two years 
and eight months of mandatory detention was prolonged and thus 
required a bond hearing.128 Several years later, in Casas-Castrillon v. 
Department of Homeland Security,129 the court held that once a removal 
order is appealed to the Court of Appeals and remanded, mandatory 
detention is no longer authorized.130 The court avoided the due process 
problem, which would be caused by such prolonged detention, by 
construing INA section 236(c) to provide no authority for detention after 
the case reached the Court of Appeals on a petition for review of the 
agency order, holding that authority for detention had shifted to INA 
section 236(a), which requires a bond hearing.131 It did not address the 
question of whether detention might also become prolonged before a 
removal case reached the Court of Appeals. 
Courts in the Ninth Circuit began analyzing the procedures required 
for a bond hearing in this circumstance, finding that in light of the already 
prolonged detention, due process requires more robust procedures than 
are typical in an immigration court bond hearing. For example, whereas in 
traditional immigration bond hearings the burden falls on the non-citizen 
to show entitlement to release, in “Casas hearings” (and now “Rodriguez 
hearings”) the government bears the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the individual is a flight risk or a danger to 
community.132 Unlike traditional immigration bond hearings, Casas and 
Rodriguez hearings also must be recorded to allow for meaningful review.133 
Several years after Demore, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Zadvydas’s 
continued vitality by recognizing a presumptive six-month limit on 
detention of some “arriving aliens”—individuals arrested at the border, 
including returning lawful permanent residents—who are subject to a 
 
 127. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 128. Id. at 1242. 
 129. 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 130. Id. at 948. See generally Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1114–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (reviewing 
Ninth Circuit caselaw on prolonged immigration detention). 
 131. Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 942 (“An alien whose case is being adjudicated before the 
agency for a second time—after having fought his case in this court and won . . . has not received 
expeditious process. We therefore conclude that the mandatory [] detention of aliens under § 1226(c) 
was intended to apply for only a limited time and ended in this case when the BIA affirmed Casas’ 
order of removal . . . . Thereafter, the Attorney General’s detention authority rests with § 1226(a).”); 
see Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1116 (citing Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 951; Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242) (“We 
have subsequently clarified that, in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions raised by 
indefinite mandatory detention, detention of an alien beyond an expedited period ceases to be 
mandatory under Section 1226(c) and instead becomes discretionary under Section 1226(a).”). 
 132. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 133. Id. at 1208–09; see, e.g., Benavides-Duran v. Asher, No. 12-0913, 2012 WL 5471090, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2012) (applying this rule). 
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different form of mandatory detention.134 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, like 
Zadvydas, involved a petitioner who had argued that his removal could 
not be effectuated even if he were to be ordered removed.135 The court 
focused on whether his removal was reasonably foreseeable and reinforced 
the idea that a six-month period was significant for purposes of a due 
process analysis.136 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently extended the reasoning of Tijani and 
Casas-Castrillon to require bond hearings in cases of prolonged post-final-
order detention—that is, in cases involving the same detention statute at 
issue in Zadvydas, INA section 241(a)(6). In Diouf v. Napolitano,137 the 
court held that detention of an individual who has a judicial stay of 
removal and petition for review of a motion to reopen pending before the 
circuit court is governed by INA section 241(a)(6).138 The Diouf panel 
then relied upon the reasoning and time periods at issue in Demore and 
Casas-Castrillon—along with the procedural due process analysis laid out 
in Mathews v. Eldridge—to hold that this discretionary detention of 
individuals with a final order becomes prolonged, and thus requires a 
bond hearing, after six months.139 The court ordered a bond hearing even 
though Diouf, unlike Zadvydas, had no practical barrier to his deportation, 
and even though INA section 241(a)(6) makes no express reference to 
bond hearings.140 
Most recently, in the 2013 Rodriguez v. Robbins class action 
decision, the Ninth Circuit extended the analysis used in Diouf to 
“construe the government’s statutory mandatory detention authority 
under Section 1226(c) and Section 1225(b) [categorical detention for 
‘arriving aliens’] as limited to a six-month period, subject to a finding of 
 
 134. See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2006). There is some debate over 
the level of due process protections that should be afforded individuals deemed “inadmissible” as 
opposed to “deportable.” See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (“The Government, 
joined by the dissent, argues that the statutory purpose and the constitutional concerns that influenced 
our statutory construction in Zadvydas are not present for aliens . . . who have not been admitted to 
the United States. Be that as it may, it cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different 
meaning when such aliens are involved.”); Bertrand v. Holder, No. 10-0604, 2011 WL 4356375 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that inadmissible individuals have no procedural due process rights), 
adopted by 2011 WL 4356369 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2011). 
 135. Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1071. 
 136. Id. at 1078. 
 137. 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 138. Id. at 1085. 
 139. Id. at 1092 n.13 (“As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has lasted six months 
and is expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.”) 
 140. Id.; see Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, No. 10-02211, 2011 WL 5966657, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 
2011) (citing Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While Casas-Castrillon did not 
define what constitutes a ‘prolonged’ period, the Ninth Circuit later extended the Supreme Court’s 
definition of what is presumptively reasonable in the 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) removal contexti.e., a six-
month detention periodto pre-removal discretionary detentions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”)). 
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flight risk or dangerousness.”141 The district court subsequently entered a 
permanent injunction requiring DHS to provide each individual in 
mandatory immigration detention in the Central District of California, 
“by the class member’s 181 st day of detention, with a . . . bond hearing 
before an Immigration Judge consistent with the substantive and 
procedural requirements” set forth in prior Ninth Circuit detention cases 
and in the court’s order.142 The injunction also requires DHS to identify 
class members periodically over the course of two years.143  
B. The Third and Sixth Circuits 
The Third and Sixth Circuits have likewise recognized that INA 
section 236(c) does not require open-ended detention without a bond 
hearing. The Sixth Circuit held in Ly v. Hansen “that the INS may detain 
prima facie removable aliens for a time reasonably required to complete 
removal proceedings in a timely manner. If the process takes an 
unreasonably long time, the detainee may seek relief in habeas 
proceedings.”144 Focusing on the idea of unreasonableness, the Sixth 
Circuit eschewed a clear rule in favor of a flexible list of factors. It held: 
[A] bright-line time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas, would not be 
appropriate for the pre-removal period; hearing schedules and other 
proceedings must have leeway for expansion or contraction as the 
necessities of the case and the immigration judge’s caseload warrant. In 
the absence of a set period of time, courts must examine the facts of 
each case, to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in 
concluding removal proceedings.145 
Citing language from Zadvydas, the Sixth Circuit held that once 
detention became prolonged, the government would have to show a 
“strong and special justification”146 for continued detention and would have 
to hold a hearing on the justification. In petitioner Ly’s case, pre-final-
order detention had been prolonged and removal was not practical 
 
 141. 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 142. Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 07-3239, 2013 WL 5229795, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 143. Id. at *4. Shortly before this Article went to press, Judge Michael A. Ponsor of the District of 
Massachusetts accepted the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and adopted a six-month rule. Reid v. Donelan, 
No. 13-30125, 2014 WL 105026, at *4–5 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014); see Bautista v. Sabol, 862 F. Supp. 2d 
375, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“While courts have declined to establish concrete rules for appropriate 
detention periods, there exists a point—somewhere around the seven month mark—where pre-
removal detention becomes universally questionable.”) (addressing detention during expedited 
removal proceedings). Judge Ponsor held that this rule was supported by Supreme Court precedent, 
the due process concerns raised by prolonged detention, and concerns regarding access to courts, 
which this Article explores further below.  
 144. 351 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 2003); see also id. at 275 (Haynes, J., concurring) (“[A]ny time 
periods that exceed the time limits cited in [Demore v.] Kim would be presumptively 
unconstitutional.”). 
 145. Id. at 271 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. 
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because the United States was not deporting people to their country of 
citizenship.147 
The Third Circuit has adopted a similar approach. Even before the 
Third Circuit took up this issue, many district courts within the Third 
Circuit had recognized temporal limits on mandatory detention. In 
determining reasonableness of past detention, most of the district courts 
considered some combination of the factors that Judge John E. Jones 
identified in the published Middle District of Pennsylvania decision Alli 
v. Decker: whether the detention has continued beyond the average time 
necessary for completion of removal proceedings; the probable extent of 
future removal proceedings; the likelihood that removal proceedings 
actually will result in removal; and the conduct of both parties in the 
removal proceedings.148 
In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the Third Circuit held that once 
mandatory detention pursuant to INA section 236(c) becomes 
unreasonably prolonged, mandatory detention no longer serves the 
legitimate purposes of the statute and section 236(c) ceases to govern the 
individual’s detention.149 Like the Sixth150 and the Ninth151 Circuits, the 
court adopted this construction of the statute to avoid having to strike it 
down on due process grounds.152 The Third Circuit construed INA 
section 236(c) to permit mandatory detention only so long as it was not 
unreasonably prolonged.153 While recognizing that Justice Kennedy “did 
not frame the issue this way,” it “read Justice Kennedy’s [concurring 
opinion in Demore] to uphold the statute on its face, while leaving open 
the possibility that it might be unconstitutional as applied.”154 
The Third Circuit held that the petitioner’s thirty-five month 
detention had become unreasonably prolonged but “decline[d] to 
establish a universal point at which detention will always be considered 
unreasonable.”155 Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, the Third 
Circuit did not define reasonableness. It explained the analysis only in 
 
 147. Id. at 266 n.1. 
 148. Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 543–44 (M.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 
650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 149. 656 F.3d 221, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 150. Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[B]y construing the pre-removal detention 
statute to include an implicit requirement that removal proceedings be concluded within a reasonable 
time, we avoid the need to mandate the procedural protections that would be required to detain 
deportable aliens indefinitely.”); see id. at 269 (“[W]hile Congress did express a desire to have certain 
criminal aliens incarcerated during removal proceedings, it also made clear that such proceedings were 
to proceed quickly.”). 
 151. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 152. Diop, 656 F.3d at 235. 
 153. Id. at 233. 
 154. Id. at 232 n.10. 
 155. Id. at 233–34. 
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general terms: “[T]he reasonableness determination must take into 
account a given individual detainee’s need for more or less time, as well 
as the exigencies of a particular case,” and “must take into account errors 
in the proceedings that cause unnecessary delay.”156 The Diop court 
faulted the immigration judge and government attorneys for unnecessary 
delays in Diop’s case.157 But it did not consider whether a three-year 
detention might have been reasonable if the government actors had not 
erred, nor recognize any general rules for how these factors should affect 
the reasonableness analysis. 
In Leslie v. Attorney General,158 the Third Circuit addressed the final 
factor in Alli, which focuses on the conduct of the individual and the 
government in removal proceedings.159 Among all of the factors in Alli, 
the district courts in the Third Circuit have discussed this one the most 
extensively, interpreting it in divergent ways.160 The Leslie court held that 
the fact that an individual had pursued bona fide challenges to his removal, 
including a successful appeal, did not make the corresponding extension in 
his mandatory detention reasonable, since a contrary holding would 
“effectively punish [Leslie] for pursuing applicable legal remedies.”161 
Thus, all three of the circuit courts to have squarely addressed the issue 
have held that mandatory detention has some type of temporal limits. This 
conclusion is compelled by Demore’s emphasis on the brevity of detention, 
by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, and by Zadvydas and the Salerno 
line of cases. The more challenging question is how to define these limits. 
IV.  The Case for a Six-Month Limit on Mandatory Detention 
This Part argues that courts can consistently give effect to both 
Demore and Zadvydas by providing a bond hearing after six months to any 
individual who was initially subject to mandatory detention under INA 
section 236(c), regardless of the course that her removal proceedings have 
taken. In raising this subject, I do not intend to suggest that Demore was 
rightly decided or that due process permits mandatory detention without 
a bond hearing in the first instance. Rather, this Article focuses on how 
lower courts should respond to Demore because this is a question with 
great practical import. The choice of rule or standard gives content to an 
 
 156. Id. at 234. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 678 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 159. Id. at 270–71. 
 160. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 161. Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 271 (3rd Cir, 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Oyedeji 
v. Ashcroft, 332 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (M.D. Pa. 2004)). 
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otherwise abstract constitutional principle,162 and shapes the experience 
of individuals subject to mandatory detention. 
This Part first argues that six months has been recognized as a 
constitutionally significant benchmark in due process jurisprudence. It 
then proposes that prudential considerations, based upon district courts’ 
application of the “unreasonably prolonged” standard and institutional 
considerations, likewise support a six-month bright-line limit on 
mandatory detention. The reasonableness standard adopted by the Sixth 
and Third Circuits allows for significant flexibility but has led to 
inconsistent approaches to similar facts and does not sufficiently account 
for the largely unrepresented nature of the detained population or other 
pragmatic concerns that arise in an administrative court system. 
A. Doctrinal Basis for a Six-Month Limit 
By predicating its decision on a “brief” period of detention,163 
Demore left intact Zadvydas’s holding that long periods of immigration 
detention raise serious due process concerns and that six months 
represents a significant deprivation of due process. Respondent Hyung 
Joon Kim had been held in mandatory detention for six months before a 
district court granted his habeas petition and an immigration judge 
released him on bond based upon his low flight risk and lack of danger to 
the community.164 Demore emphasized that “the detention at stake under 
§ 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in 
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in 
 
 162. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 857, 939 (1999) (arguing for a reexamination of “the illusion that constitutional rights are defined 
by courts through a process of identifying pure constitutional values without regard to functional, fact-
specific policy concerns”). A number of authors have proposed taxonomies for the judicially-created 
rules or standards used to implement abstract articulations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Mitchell N. 
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2004) (distinguishing between 
“constitutional operative propositions (judicial statements of what the Constitution means)” and 
“constitutional decision rules (judicial statements of how courts should decide whether the operative 
propositions have been complied with)”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 106 (1997) (arguing that “[c]onstitutional doctrine and the tests by 
which it is partly constituted matter enormously” and cataloging different types of constitutional 
balancing tests and other implementation methods); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 80 (2000) (“Judicial doctrines, working alongside rules laid down 
and practices built up by other branches, properly fill in the document’s outline, making broad principles 
workably specific in a court and in the world.”). 
 163. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably concerned that 
deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for 
their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as respondent be detained for 
the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”); see id. at 528 (citation omitted) (“While 
the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’ the detention 
here is of a much shorter duration.”). 
 164. Id. at 515, 530–31. 
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which the alien chooses to appeal.”165 Particularly in light of the focus of 
both the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy on the brevity of the 
detention at issue, Demore is consistent with Zadvydas’s presumption that 
detention for longer than six months raises serious due process concerns.166 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that individuals like Kim, 
who still have lawful permanent residency status and have not been 
ordered removed, are sometimes considered to have greater due process 
rights than individuals who, like Zadvydas, have no immigration status in 
the United States.167 Moreover, the remedy proposed here and recently 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit—a bond hearing after six months—is far 
more limited than the release required by Zadvydas. 
Moreover, reading the mandatory detention statute to require 
detention beyond the period approved in Demore is problematic because 
even the six-month period of mandatory detention was unprecedented in 
general civil detention jurisprudence. As discussed above, no other 
peacetime decision has authorized such prolonged civil detention without 
an individualized finding of dangerousness.168 Given the serious due 
process concerns underlying the analysis of INA section 236(c), courts 
should err on the side of limiting mandatory detention to the period 
addressed in Demore. 
The Salerno line of cases supports the conclusion that lower courts 
should not extend Demore to uphold mandatory detention for longer 
periods of time. The Supreme Court has required stringent substantive 
standards and strong procedural protections for civil detention, 
particularly when prolonged.169 For example, pretrial detention under the 
Bail Reform Act was deemed constitutional because it required “a full-
blown adversary hearing” and “clear and convincing” proof that “no 
conditions of release” could “reasonably assure the safety of the 
community or any person,”170 even though the length of detention was 
limited by the Speedy Trial Act to about one-hundred days.171 The sex 
 
 165. Id. at 530. 
 166. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (“We do have reason to believe, however, 
that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months.”); 
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 113744 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the application of Demore); 
Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011); Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125, 2014 WL 
105026, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014).  
 167. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25–27 (1982); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 
378 (2005) (holding that post-final-order detention statute must be interpreted in the same way for 
LPRs and non-LPR individuals subject to the statute). 
 168. Cole, supra note 78, at 1009–10; see supra Part II. 
 169. See supra Part II. 
 170. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–50 (1987). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). With very limited exceptions, the Speedy Trial Act requires that an 
information or indictment be issued within thirty days and that the trial commence within seventy days 
from the information or indictment. 
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offender commitment scheme in Kansas v. Hendricks permitted detention 
for up to one year at a time, but the Court justified its decision to uphold 
this scheme by reference to Kansas’ “strict procedural safeguards,” 
including a right to trial by jury and a requirement that the government 
prove the need for commitment beyond a reasonable doubt.172 In Foucha 
v. Louisiana, the Court struck down civil commitment schemes providing 
for indefinite detention, overturning a civil contempt order that carried a 
one-year sentence because the individual was provided with neither a 
lawyer nor adequate alternative procedural safeguards.173 
The Mathews v. Eldridge style analysis employed in Nadarajah 
references these core due process concerns, balancing them against the 
minimal process of an immigration court bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit 
has also applied a Mathews v. Eldridge style analysis in Diouf v. Napolitano, 
finding the private interests at stake to be “profound,” and the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of liberty absent a hearing to be “substantial.”174 
 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized the procedural 
safeguards that Congress has created for the few types of immigration 
detention that it expressly authorized to continue beyond six months.175 
The choice of six-month increments in these statutes bolsters the 
conclusion that the mandatory detention statute should not be construed 
to permit prolonged detention without procedural protections and that 
six months is a significant period for due process purposes.176 Similarly, in 
 
 172. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997) (“The numerous procedural and evidentiary 
protections afforded here demonstrate that the Kansas Legislature has taken great care to confine 
only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals, and then only after meeting the strictest 
procedural standards.”). 
 173. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992) (citations omitted) (“It was emphasized in 
Salerno that the detention we [the Court] found constitutionally permissible was strictly limited in 
duration. Here, in contrast, the State asserts that because Foucha once committed a criminal act and 
now has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which 
there is no effective treatment, he may be held indefinitely.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–
33 (1979) (striking down civil commitment scheme providing for indefinite detention because standard 
of proof by government was too low); see also Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (holding that final commitment hearing was required within two weeks from initial detention). 
 174. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2011); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (discussing the detention of individuals in expedited removal proceedings); see 
Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125, 2014 WL 105026, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014). 
 175. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 176. See id. (“Further, the structure of the immigration statutes, with specific attention given to 
potential detentions of over six months in carefully defined categories, indicates that the period of 
detention allowed under the general detention statutes must be construed as being brief and 
reasonable, as the Supreme Court has determined in construing similar provisions.”); see also id. at 
1076–77 (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(A)which provide for detention without a 
bond hearing for individuals intercepted at the borderare presumptively limited to six months). 
First, the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes detention without a bond hearing for individuals whom 
the government suspects to be terrorists or to pose threats to national security. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a; id. 
§§ 1531–1537; see Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1078. Section 1226a provides for mandatory detention, until 
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an article setting forth an autonomy-based justification for preventative 
detention, legal philosopher Alec Walen surveyed jurisprudence extending 
beyond immigration detention and observed that “six months seems to 
reflect a reasonable outer limit on what can count as ‘short-term’ 
detention.”177 For all of these reasons, the Ninth Circuit rule comports with 
due process.178  
B. A Pragmatic Approach 
This Subpart contrasts the practical consequences of the rule and 
standard discussed above. First, it reviews district court decisions 
implementing the flexible reasonableness standard and compares these 
results to Ninth Circuit judicial doctrine. Second, it proposes institutional 
features of the removal system that courts should consider in choosing a 
rule or standard.  
 
the time of removal, of any non-citizen whom the Attorney General has certified as meeting one of the 
terrorism-related or other national security-related criteria set forth in the statute. Id. § 1226a(a)(6). 
These grounds are extremely broad. Presumably in response to Zadvydas, however, Congress included 
a section titled “Limitation on indefinite detention,” which provides that an individual detained under 
this section of the USA PATRIOT Act “whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable 
future, may be detained for additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the alien will 
threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person.” Id. 
While this detention statute itself raises serious constitutional concerns, the choice of six-month 
increments for administrative review and for triggering a heightened substantive standard suggests 
that Congress saw this period as constitutionally significant. Id. § 1226a(a)(7).  
Second, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1537, which were enacted years before Zadvydas as part of the 1996 
amendments, created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court. Congress empowered this court, which 
operates separately from the immigration court system, to hold removal hearings for any non-citizen 
about whom “the Attorney General has classified information that an alien is an alien terrorist.” Id. 
§ 1533(a)(1). Such proceedings may be instituted based upon the Attorney General’s certification that 
(among other things) the noncitizen is a terrorist and that his or her removal proceedings “would pose 
a risk to the national security of the United States.” Id. §§ 1533(a)(1)(B), 1533(a)(1)(D). The statute 
gives the Attorney General discretion over whether to detain people in such proceedings and provides 
for release hearings only for lawful permanent residents. Id. § 1536(a). At the same time, it provides 
that the Attorney General must review his decision to certify an individual every six months. See id. 
§ 1226a(a)(7); see also Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1078–79. Thus, while this statute too raises serious 
constitutional problems, it suggests that Congress viewed six months of detention as a significant 
period even before Zadvydas. 
 177. Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventative Detention for 
Suspected Terrorists, 70 Md. L. Rev. 871, 916 (2011). In addition to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Zadvydas, Walen points to several other examples suggesting that six months is a key outer limit for 
short-term detention, including a provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to internment 
of civilians and the maximum punishment for a petty criminal offense without the right to a jury trial. 
Id. at 915 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)). 
 178. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Diouf v. Napolitano, 
634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has 
lasted six months and is expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.”); Heeren, 
supra note 10, at 632 (noting that DHS could interpret INA section 236(c) to impose a six-month limit 
on mandatory detention).  
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As a preliminary matter, understanding the effects of different rules 
and standards and the institutional features of the system in which they 
will operate is particularly important where the constitution and relevant 
statutes do not expressly dictate a method of implementation. Thus, in 
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court recognized an implicit presumption of 
release after six months “for the sake of uniform administration in the 
federal courts.”179 Although this type of statutory construction is often 
the province of the Supreme Court, the due process concerns at issue in 
civil detention are sufficiently acute that at least a few lower courts have 
likewise construed ambiguously-worded detention statutes to require a 
hearing within a set period of time even where the statutes did not 
explicitly include a deadline. For example, district courts have ruled that 
to avoid a due process problem, a hearing is required within seventy-two 
hours of a civil commitment based on mental illness or commitment of a 
juvenile.180 
Where the text of a constitutional right can encompass different 
methods of implementation, the courts should choose among these 
methods based in part on an understanding of their practical effects, within 
the relevant institutional structure.181 As Richard Fallon has written, for 
example, the Supreme Court must “assess the competence of courts to 
conduct particular kinds of inquiries; the costs that particular tests are 
likely to engender—including judicial errors of both over- and under-
protection and the burdens of litigation under narrower and broader, or 
more and less determinate, doctrinal formulations.”182 
This Subpart compares the effects of the circuit courts’ differing 
approaches to defining prolonged detention. This analysis of district court 
 
 179. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (“Consequently, for the sake of uniform 
administration in the federal courts, we recognize that [six-month] period.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Luna v. Van Zandt, 554 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (applying the Mathews 
balancing test and holding that the state was required to conduct a hearing on the patient’s continued 
detention, with burden on the government, within seventy-two hours of beginning protective custody); 
Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (setting a seventy-two hour hearing requirement 
with limited exceptions and absolute requirement of hearing after seven days), aff’d, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that due process required 
probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours, and full commitment hearing within two weeks of 
detention, in juvenile commitment context), dismissed as moot, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); see also United States 
v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 332 (D. Mass. 2007) (requiring probable cause hearing within forty-eight 
hours of scheduled release of federal prisoners deemed “sexually dangerous”). 
 181. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 207–08 
(1988) (“[I]n deciding constitutional cases, the courts constantly consider institutional capacities and 
propensities. That is, to a large extent, what constitutional law consists of: courts create constitutional 
doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional 
provisions and institutional realities. . . . [I]t makes much more sense to read into the Constitution a 
general requirement that its various provisions be interpreted in light of institutional realities than to 
insist that those realities be ignored.”); Fallon, supra note 162, at 65–66. 
 182. Fallon, supra note 162, at 66. 
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decisions shows that the Third and Sixth Circuit approach, in practice, 
leads to disparate results and often accords insufficient attention to the 
magnitude of the deprivation of liberty at issue. In contrast, a clear six-
month limit provides a framework for more consistently avoiding the 
most egregious deprivations of liberty.183 Next, the analysis of institutional 
features of the removal system shows that the clear six-month rule allows 
for far more meaningful real-world administration of temporal limits than 
does the flexible reasonableness standard, particularly for the large portion 
of unrepresented people in detention.  
1. Disparate District Court Approaches 
The proliferation of district court habeas decisions addressing 
prolonged mandatory detention, particularly in the Third Circuit, provides 
a useful illustration of how a flexible reasonableness standard is applied in 
practice.184 The Ninth Circuit’s 2013 decision in Rodriguez v. Robbins 
makes clear that anyone who has been in mandatory immigration 
detention for more than six months is entitled to a bond hearing.185 In 
contrast, the Third and Sixth Circuits’ flexible standard, which provides 
that bond hearings are required only when mandatory detention becomes 
“unreasonably prolonged,” leaves greater uncertainty and has led to 
disparate results that do not always focus on the magnitude of the 
deprivation of liberty at issue. As discussed above, the Third Circuit held 
in Diop that “the reasonableness determination must take into account a 
given individual detainee’s need for more or less time, as well as the 
exigencies of a particular case,” and “must take into account errors in the 
proceedings that cause unnecessary delay.”186 It did not mandate a 
particular test or set a definite temporal limit on mandatory detention.  
District court judges in the Third Circuit have applied the 
reasonableness standard to interpret similar facts in different ways, 
 
 183. See generally Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 384 (1985); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1688 (1976) (“It 
has been common ground . . . that the two great social virtues of . . . rules . . . are the restraint of 
official arbitrariness and certainty.”). Moreover, “rules will be relatively cheaper (and thus more 
desirable) in areas of law where identical disputes arise frequently.” Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral 
Analysis and Legal Forms: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 33 (2000). From an 
economic perspective, “added cost from having resolved the issue . . . at the promulgation stage will be 
outweighed by the benefit of having avoided additional costs repeatedly incurred in giving content to a 
standard on a retail basis.” Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke 
L.J. 557, 563 (1992). 
 184. This Part focuses primarily on the Third Circuit because this circuit has a large number of 
relevant district court habeas decisions. This Article discusses cases from the past few years, not only 
after Diop, because many courts in the Third Circuit had previously applied a similar reasonableness 
standard based on Ly.   
 185. Rodriguez v. Robbins, No. 07-3239, 2012 WL 7653016, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012). 
 186. Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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particularly where detention has lasted more than six months but not yet 
two or more years.187 Although a number of judges have simply stated that 
cases involving removal proceedings that have lasted significantly longer 
than average—typically a matter of years—involve unreasonably 
prolonged detention,188 others have applied some combination of the 
factors that Judge John E. Jones enumerated in his published decision Alli 
v. Decker: (1) the length of past detention, (2) the reason proceedings have 
been extended (including an allocation of responsibility for delays between 
the parties), (3) the expected duration of future removal proceedings, and 
(4) the likelihood that proceedings will result in removal.189 
The second and fourth factors, in particular, are not directly related to 
the due process principles that undergird the constitutional avoidance 
analysis. As a matter of both doctrine and the experience of the detainees, 
the duration of detention more meaningfully reflects the seriousness of the 
deprivation of liberty than the question of which party “caused” delays.190 
Focusing on the latter shifts the courts’ focus from the magnitude of the 
deprivation of liberty to a contest over the parties’ conduct in removal 
proceedings. Immigration detention, which is at least formally civil in 
nature, should not be converted to a sanction for an individual’s conduct 
 
 187. Cases with the most egregious durations of past detention are sometimes found to involve 
“unreasonably prolonged” detention primarily on this basis. See, e.g., Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 678 F.3d 
265, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that mandatory detention was unreasonable because it lasted four 
years); Nwozuzu v. Napolitano, No. 12-3963, 2012 WL 3561972, at *4, *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2012) 
(finding that the typical removal proceeding should take between one-and-[a-]half and five months, 
and finding that a twenty-eight month detention was “unreasonably long”). 
 188. See, e.g., Leslie, 678 F.3d at 270–71 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the expected time for the case 
was five months, and that the individual’s detention was unreasonable because it lasted four years); 
Nwozuzu, 2012 WL 3561972, at *4, *6 (finding that the typical removal proceeding should take 
between one-and-a-half and five months, and finding that a twenty-eight month detention was 
“unreasonably long”); see also Bete v. Holder, No. 11-6405, 2012 WL 1067747, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 
2012) (finding a twelve-month detention not unreasonably long in part because periods of detention 
that the Court of Appeals deemed unreasonably prolonged in Diop and Leslie were significantly 
longer). 
 189. 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542–43 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 
2003)), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011). Alli was frequently cited because 
Judge Jones discussed the district courts’ emerging consensus that INA section 236(c) did not 
authorize unreasonably prolonged detention, and he catalogued factors that courts should consider in 
determining whether to award a bond hearing, while adopting the Sixth Circuit’s reasonableness 
standard. The Court adopts the Sixth Circuit’s instruction to “examine the facts of each case, to 
determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding removal proceedings.” Id. at 540. 
 190. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (citation omitted) (upholding mandatory 
detention because, “[w]hile the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was ‘indefinite’ and 
‘potentially permanent,’ the detention here is of a much shorter duration.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992) (citation omitted ) (“It was emphasized in Salerno that the detention [the Court] 
found constitutionally permissible was strictly limited in duration. Here, in contrast, the State asserts 
that because Foucha once committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that 
sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which there is no effective treatment, he may be 
held indefinitely.”). 
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in removal proceedings. The reasonableness standard also implies that 
routine government backlogs (particularly in the absence of bad faith by 
the government) can justify severe deprivations of liberty, even though 
this proposition finds no support in the Supreme Court’s due process 
jurisprudence. Both overloaded immigration court dockets and long 
processing times for applications filed with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, which often must be approved before an 
immigration judge can grant applications for relief, routinely delay 
removal proceedings.191 
Determining which party is “responsible” for delays in immigration 
court proceedings can be daunting and subjective. First, with regard to 
individuals’ appeals and applications for relief, the Third Circuit has 
adopted the Sixth Circuit’s holding that, “[a]lthough an alien may be 
responsible for seeking relief, he is not responsible for the amount of 
time that such determinations may take.”192 However, this guidance has 
proven susceptible to different interpretations, and district courts have 
adopted inconsistent approaches to facts such as individual respondents’ 
appeals or applications and government appeals. Many judges have held 
that applications or appeals filed in good faith do not justify prolonged 
detention without a bond hearing193 but other judges have held that 
 
 191. “[A]s of July 2009, EOIR could not adjudicate approximately 17,000 removal cases due to 
pending USCIS decisions.” Margaret Scotti, Development in the Executive Branch: ICE Prioritizes 
Certain Aliens for Detention and Removal; Explores Options for Improving Detainment Conditions, 
25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 227, 230 (2010) (citing Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, at 1 (Aug. 20, 2010)). A 2011 USCIS Policy Memorandum 
observed that “EOIR has identified a significant number of removal proceedings involving individuals 
with applications or petitions pending before USCIS. While awaiting the full and proper adjudication 
of the applications and petitions, EOIR’s immigration judges have repeatedly continued many of the 
removal proceedings.” Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Guidance for 
Coordinating the Adjudication of Applications and Petitions Involving Individuals in Removal 
Proceedings; Revisions to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) New Chapter 10.3(i): AFM Update 
AD 11–16 (Feb. 4, 2011). 
 192. Leslie, 678 F.3d at 271 (citing Ly, 351 F.3d at 272) (holding that a four-year period of 
mandatory detention was unreasonably prolonged where the individual had pursued bona fide 
challenges to removal and sought only a five-week continuance). 
 193. E.g., Nwozuzu v. Napolitano, No. 12-3963, 2012 WL 3561972, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2012) 
(holding that courts “should also deduct delays attributable to the petitioner, but not those caused by 
the pursuit of bona fide legal challenges to removal” and granting bond hearing because detention had 
lasted twenty-eight months, the petitioner’s continuances were a small fraction of delays before the 
immigration court, and petitioner’s appeal had been successful); Gupta v. Sabol, 1:11-1081, 2011 WL 
3897964 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011) (finding a twenty-month detention unreasonably long even though 
the detention was caused by the detainee’s two appeals); Madrane v. Hogan, 520 F. Supp. 2d 654 
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that individual’s requests for continuances were reasonable and granting 
bond hearing). “To consider the time related to a petitioner’s bona fide legal challenges would unduly 
punish a petitioner for seeking to enforce his rights.” See Nwozuzu, 2012 WL 3561972, at *4 (citing 
Leslie, 678 F.3d at 271); but cf. Diaz v. Muller, No. 11-4029, 2011 WL 3422856, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 
2011) (finding that the individual’s detention was reasonable because he “conceded at the hearing that 
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routine extensions of removal proceedings due to respondents’ 
applications or appeals can render prolonged periods of detention 
reasonable.194 As discussed above, removal proceedings for individuals 
who are eligible for relief from removal (for example, those eligible for 
asylum or Convention Against Torture relief) or who have a colorable 
argument that they are not even “removable” in the first instance—often 
a complex issue—typically last longer than those for individuals who lack 
grounds to fight their deportations.195 Moreover, when an individual is 
counseled, continuances requested by the party’s attorney can result 
from attorney failures rather than an effort by the individual to delay 
proceedings.  
Third Circuit district courts have taken similarly varied approaches 
to considering the impact of administrative appeals by DHS. Some 
judges have held that government appeals weigh in favor of a finding that 
detention has become unreasonably prolonged such that a bond hearing 
is required. For example, in Tkochenko v. Sabol,196 Judge Christopher 
Connor of the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that a two-year 
detention was unreasonably prolonged where it was likely to continue 
due to a government appeal, reasoning that “delays attributable to the 
government weigh heavily against the respondents in conducting this 
analysis.”197 Similarly, in Akinola v. Weber,198 Judge William Martini of 
the District of New Jersey emphasized that the government, not the 
 
he actually does not want the Immigration Court to speed up his removal proceedings” because he 
wanted time to pursue post-conviction relief). 
 194. E.g., Johnson v. Orsino, No. 12-6913, 2013 WL 1767740, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2013) 
(applying Third and Sixth Circuit approach and deeming fifteen-month detention not unreasonably 
prolonged because individual’s appeal had been pending for four months); Espinoza-Loor v. Holder, 
No. 11-6993, 2012 WL 2951642, at *1, *7 (D.N.J. July 2, 2012) (finding a thirteen-month detention not 
unreasonably prolonged because detainee requested adjournments to have his I-130 petition adjudicated 
by another agency); Maynard v. Hendrix, No. 11-0605, 2011 WL 6176202, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2011) 
(finding an eighteen month detention not unreasonably long because “the delays here are attributable 
almost exclusively to Petitioner’s repeated requests for adjournments”); Bestman v. Decker, No. 1:11-CV-
984, 2011 WL 3206685, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-0984 
(M.D. Pa. July 28, 2011) (holding that nineteen-month mandatory detention was permissible because 
petitioner “applied for asylum, sought withholding of removal or cancellation of removal, and requested 
withholding of removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture,” and pursued an appeal); 
Nivar v. Weber, No. 10-0825, 2010 WL 4024771, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2010) (holding that the fact that 
detainee had requested a single continuance in removal proceedings meant that he was not entitled to a 
bond hearing) (six-month detention); see also Bete v. Holder, No. 11- 6405, 2012 WL 1067747, at *8 
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012) (finding a twelve-month detention not unreasonably prolonged in part because 
detainee was responsible for twenty-one days of his detention, without explaining reason for 
continuance). 
 195. See supra note 31. 
 196. 792 F. Supp. 2d 733 (M.D. Pa. 2011). 
 197. Id. at 741. 
 198. No. 09-3415, 2010 WL 376603, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010). 
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individual petitioner, was responsible for delay because the government 
had appealed the immigration court’s decision.199 
 In contrast, Judge John E. Jones of the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania held that detention was not unreasonably prolonged even 
though it had already lasted sixteen months and ICE had appealed a grant 
of Convention Against Torture relief. He reasoned that “there is nothing 
on the record before this Court to suggest that the government’s decision 
to appeal the Immigration Judge’s decision to grant deferral of removal 
is an unreasonable course of action.”200 Similarly, Judge Malcolm Muir 
held that a detention of thirteen-and-a-half months was not unreasonably 
prolonged even though the government’s BIA appeal had been pending 
for almost the entire period. He found that “there is no indication of 
delay or stalling on the part of ICE” and concluded without further 
discussion that “the matter is moving forward at a permissible pace.”201 
The Third Circuit district court decisions ultimately demonstrate a lack of 
clarity or agreement as to whether the concept of “reasonableness” refers 
to the magnitude of the deprivation of liberty or the government’s actions. 
The Third Circuit district court judges have also adopted disparate 
approaches to analyzing the expected duration of future detention. Some 
judges emphasized the procedural posture of the underlying removal cases 
where this posture suggests future proceedings are likely to be 
prolonged.202 Others have found this factor irrelevant or omitted any 
mention of it.203  
Finally, disparities also emerge with respect to a related factor, the 
likelihood of success in removal proceedings. Evidence that removal is 
 
 199. Id. at *5; see Victor v. Mukasey, No. 3:CV-08-1914, 2008 WL 5061810 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008). 
 200. Jayasekara v. Warden, No. 1:10-1649, 2011 WL 31346, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2011) (finding 
similarly that petitioner’s request for continuance was not unreasonable, and denying bond hearing on 
theory that future detention was unlikely to be prolonged). 
 201. Segura v. Holder, No. 4:CV-10-2045, 2010 WL 5356499, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010). The 
court stated in a footnote that the court “may not take such a deferential view of this delay if this case 
comes before this court a third time and the matter is still pending before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.” Id. at *2 n.1. But given the delays inherent in the process of filing a federal habeas action 
and the fact that the BIA was not a party to the habeas action, this observation would not appear to 
affect the outcome. 
 202. E.g., Tkochenk v. Sabol, 792 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742–43 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (expressing “no 
confidence that this is a case in which the period of continued detention pending removal has any 
fixed, finite or identifiable duration,” where past detention had lasted two years and future 
proceedings expected to last “many months” due to BIA backlog and potential remand); Donaldson v. 
Donate, No. 3:CV-09-0208, 2009 WL 5179539, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2009) (granting habeas writ 
where petitioner had been detained three years and proceedings likely to last “many months”); 
Occelin v. Dist. Dir. for Immigration Custom Enforcement, No. 1:09-CV-164, 2009 WL 1743742, at *3–
4 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) (ordering a bond hearing where government had appealed and BIA had 
not yet issued briefing schedule, meaning proceedings were likely to continue for months). 
 203. E.g., Pierre v. Sabol, No. 1:10-2634, 2011 WL 4498822, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2011) (finding 
future detention irrelevant based on a technicality). 
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unlikely has sometimes weighed in favor of habeas relief,204 and some 
judges have cited the lack of such evidence as an adverse factor, in some 
cases implying that a bond hearing is not required absent the prospect of 
truly indefinite detention.205 Other decisions do not even address this 
factor.206 Moreover, this factor is already frequently considered by the 
immigration court as part of the bond hearing itself, as relevant to flight 
risk.207 These disparities bolster the importance of a clear upper temporal 
limit for mandatory detention.  
2. Institutional Features of the Removal System 
As Zadvydas suggests, administrability concerns should inform the 
choice of rule or standard in the context of mandatory detention pending 
removal proceedings.208 Such analysis requires an understanding of the 
institutional structure in which prolonged detention challenges arise. In 
the mandatory detention context, unlike in the context of post-final-
order detention, individuals’ detention challenges often arise while they 
are in active immigration court proceedings. Other prolonged detention 
challenges arise after immigration court proceedings have concluded, 
during administrative or in some cases judicial appeals.  
While habeas proceedings provide a critical constitutional safeguard 
against unlawful detention, immigration courts can provide a more 
accessible and efficient forum for addressing challenges to pre-final-order 
detention. Although time in immigration court is limited, individuals in 
immigration court speak directly to the judge rather than being required 
to file a written pleading as they would in a habeas case.209 Detained 
individuals in removal proceedings typically have at least one opportunity 
to speak with an immigration judge before being deported. Although 
many individuals who have spent more than six months in mandatory 
detention will have already completed their immigration court 
proceedings and reached the appeal process, the immigration judge would 
 
 204. E.g., Tkochenko, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (“[G]ranting this relief is particularly appropriate 
here, where it is evident that Tkochenko has made a substantial showing that she may prevail on the 
merits; where an immigration judge has found her fears of harm to be credible.”); see also Ly v. 
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding removal not practically attainable due to lack of 
repatriation treaty); Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 544 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Madrane, 520 F. 
Supp. 2d at 658, 660) (discussing how the immigration judge had granted relief), rev’d in part, vacated 
in part, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 205. E.g., Johnson v. Orsino, No. 12-6913, 2013 WL 1767740, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2013) 
(applying Third and Sixth Circuit approach). 
 206. E.g., Tsvetkov v. Decker, No. 3:10-1042, 2010 WL 2160320 (M.D. Pa. May 26, 2010). 
 207. E.g., In re Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 490 (B.I.A. 1987).   
 208. See supra Part IV.B. 
 209. Of course, in the prolonged detention context many individuals will no longer be appearing 
before an immigration judge at the time they seek a hearing on danger and flight risk. Habeas 
petitions should be available as an option for those without access to immigration court proceedings. 
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have jurisdiction to hold a custody redetermination hearing upon being 
made aware that the individual is no longer in mandatory detention.210 
As a practical matter, habeas proceedings are often less accessible to 
people in detention than administrative court proceedings. Most detained 
individuals are unrepresented,211 and those who do have immigration 
counsel rarely can afford to retain attorneys to file habeas petitions. Few 
immigration practitioners have a background in federal habeas practice. 
Habeas proceedings, which often involve exclusively written submissions, 
are difficult to navigate without counsel. Many detainees lack the language 
or research skills necessary to successfully pursue this procedure.212 
Viewed from a systemic perspective, adjudicating detention claims 
before the immigration court would also be more efficient than litigating 
them exclusively in habeas proceedings. Immigration judges routinely 
and quickly adjudicate detention-related questions in cases pending 
before them. Individuals who are bond-eligible typically receive brief 
bond hearings on the same day as a preliminary removal hearing. Habeas 
proceedings often provide a critical check for agency errors in detention 
determinations.213 At the same time, each case can take many months to 
resolve. Habeas proceedings also require both parties to submit extensive 
written arguments and, in some cases, to appear for a hearing in district 
court. To trigger a government response and a decision on a pending 
habeas petition, a detainee will sometimes have to file an additional 
request for an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The 
adjudication of detention claims in an administrative setting often, 
although not always, eliminates the need for separate habeas proceedings. 
Thus, the best rule in this context would be one that is suitable for 
administration in immigration court as well as in habeas proceedings.214 A 
 
 210. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2013) (stating that an individual may seek custody redetermination before 
an immigration judge at any time “before an order under 8 CFR part 240 becomes final”); see Casas-
Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (finding that detention of an individual 
who has a stay of removal from the court of appeals is governed by the INA section 236(a)).  
 211. See Dona, supra note 93, at 86; see also supra note 115. 
 212. Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125, 2014 WL 105026, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014) (citing Heeren, 
supra note 10, at 603.  
 213. For example, as the experience of the Ninth Circuit has shown, habeas proceedings can play 
an important role in ensuring that proper procedures are followed in immigration court bond hearings 
when such hearings are granted. See, e.g., Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(granting the habeas writ unless a new bond hearing is held because the immigration judge violated 
the individual’s due process rights by failing to use the “clear and convincing” evidence standard, and 
failing to record proceedings); accord Dela Cruz v. Napolitano, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1201 (S.D. Cal. 
2011) (“Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the IJ’s failure to articulate the standard of 
proof to which he was holding Respondents at the . . . bond hearing.”); Singh v. Napolitano, No. 08-
0464, 2011 WL 4041000 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2011). But clearer rules about when individuals are entitled 
to bond hearings and what procedures are required should diminish the need for habeas review. 
 214. In Diouf, the Ninth Circuit held that “Diouf’s own case illustrates why a hearing before an 
immigration judge is a basic safeguard for aliens facing prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6). The 
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clear temporal limit, such as the six-month rule proposed here and 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, allows immigration judges to routinely and 
easily apply the due process limits that federal courts have recognized on 
mandatory detention. As compared with a reasonableness analysis, such 
a rule would more clearly communicate the immigration courts’ authority 
to issue bond in a particular case, and thereby trigger hearings without 
necessarily requiring action by the individuals in detention. This issue is 
particularly critical for those who would not otherwise be appearing 
before the immigration court because they are detained while their 
removal decisions are on appeal, and for those who are unrepresented 
and thus may not know that they can request a bond hearing. In the 
Central District of California, pursuant to the injunction in the class 
action Rodriguez v. Holder, the DHS now routinely identifies individuals 
who have been in mandatory detention for six months and who are 
entitled to immigration court bond hearings.215 This task is feasible due to 
the simplicity of the temporal rule.  
Regardless of the forum, a six-month limit would also avoid 
disparities. It would permit fairer resolutions for individuals who are 
unrepresented and therefore less well-equipped to request a hearing or 
present evidence on the more complex factors described in Alli. 
One might argue that a clear six-month rule could encourage 
immigration judges to deny reasonable requests for continuances, 
encourage delay by individual immigration court respondents, or 
otherwise interfere with case management.216 This objection is of limited 
force, however, because the proposed rule would not require an 
immigration judge to order release after six months, but merely to hold a 
bond hearing. Individuals could not predict with any certainty that they 
would be released after six months, since release would occur only where 
the judge determined at a hearing that the individual was not a danger to 
the community or a flight risk. Moreover, detaining a person for a 
 
government detained Diouf in March 2005. DHS conducted custody reviews under § 241.4 in July 2005 
and July 2006. In both instances, DHS determined that Diouf should remain in custody pending 
removal because his ‘criminal history and lack of family support’ suggested he might flee if released. In 
February 2007, however, an immigration judge determined that Diouf was not a flight risk and 
released him on bond. If the district court had not ordered the bond hearing on due process grounds, 
Diouf might have remained in detention until this day. To address these concerns, aliens who are 
denied release in their 180-day reviews must be afforded the opportunity to challenge their continued 
detention in a hearing before an immigration judge.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 215. Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV 07-3239, 2013 WL 5229795, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013).   
 216. Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A bright-line time limitation, as imposed in 
Zadvydas, would not be appropriate for the pre-removal period; hearing schedules and other 
proceedings must have leeway for expansion or contraction as the necessities of the case and the 
immigration judge’s caseload warrant.”). 
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prolonged period of time without a bond hearing offends fundamental 
notions of due process, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.  
Conclusion 
The idea that an individual may be jailed for even a matter of days 
without a bond hearing is troubling and out of step with prior due 
process case law. Yet so long as Demore remains good law, courts must 
reconcile this decision with the larger body of civil detention 
jurisprudence. The most straightforward approach to this challenge is to 
limit Demore to its facts. In light of the majority’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
emphasis on the “brief” nature of mandatory detention, temporal 
limitations are particularly critical to this analysis. The Ninth, Third, and 
Sixth Circuits have all recognized the limited nature of Demore and have 
taken important steps to recognize temporal limits on mandatory 
detention. 
The choice of rule or standard for implementing these due process 
limits has great practical effect on those fighting their removals, on their 
families, and on the system as a whole. The mechanism for implementing 
temporal limitations on Demore should focus on the duration of the 
underlying deprivation of liberty, account for the fact that most affected 
individuals are unrepresented, and be appropriate for administration by 
administrative immigration judges and federal district courts. A six-
month outer limit on mandatory detention is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and would provide the best option for 
interpreting Demore in a manner consistent with Zadvydas and other 
civil detention jurisprudence. 
This proposal provides a limited procedural and substantive 
safeguard against unconstitutionally prolonged detention. A clear 
temporal limit on mandatory detention does not mandate release, but does 
require a hearing at which the government must prove individualized flight 
risk or dangerousness. 
In future cases, courts will continue to grapple with prolonged 
detention as well as exploring the other limitations on Demore, such as 
the limits on detaining people who contest whether they are in fact 
removable on a ground that triggers mandatory detention, and questions 
about whether someone can be mandatorily detained if ICE failed to 
take them into custody immediately “when released” from custody for an 
enumerated offense. The six-month rule represents an important step 
toward giving practical effect to due process limits on immigration 
detention. 
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